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A CASE FOR PREGNANCY-BASED
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
Mark R. Brown*
Professor Brown argues that unemployment insurance laws
should be amended to provide coverage to otherwise eligible,
pregnant claimants. Under current law, women who quit because
of pregnancy are either disqualified from receiving unemployment
benefits altogether, or qualify only after childbirth. Those who are
fired, meanwhile, often either cannot prove the motivation for
their discharge or discover that they are disqualified because of
their unavailability for work. Professor Brown uses a case study
to illustrate the problems posed by pregnancy and unemployment
insurance. He proposes model legislation that extends coverage to
all pregnant claimants who temporarily separate from their em-
ployment.
INTRODUCTION
Although unemployment insurance laws vary from state to
state, all follow the same basic theme. An involuntary sepa-
ration from employment (firing) normally is compensable
while a voluntary separation (quitting) is not. Exceptions
exist. Willful misconduct and unavailability for work will
disqualify an involuntarily discharged claimant, but even a
voluntary quit may be compensable if the claimant had good
cause to quit and remains willing and able to work.
Pregnancy-related firings are suspect under federal' and
state antidiscrimination laws, as well as most state unemploy-
ment insurance laws. With the United States Supreme Court's
* Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law. B.S. 1981, University
of Dayton; J.D. 1984, University of Louisville School of Law. I thank Mark Esterle,
Jerry Hildebrand, Marty Malin, Debbie Maranville, and Richard McHugh for their
thoughts and criticisms, and Denise Springer for her research assistance. Special
thanks go to my former law school classmate, J. Gregory Clare, for his tireless
efforts in Jenny Brown's case.
1. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994) (prohibiting sex
discrimination in employment); Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)
(1994) (including pregnancy as within the range of sex discrimination).
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decision in Turner v. Department of Employment Security2 and
the enactment in the following year of § 3304(a)(12) of Title
26, the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA),3 it became
clear that states could not single out pregnant workers for
unfavorable treatment. Discriminatory state laws that had
proliferated prior to 1975 were ostensibly rendered ineffec-
tive.4 States were left free, however, to treat pregnancy just as
any other temporary disability.5 Because workers are often
disqualified from receiving benefits during periods of disabili-
ty, unemployment benefits are likely to be interrupted during
and immediately after pregnancy, even if the claimant was
fired solely because of her pregnancy.
Because employers seek to minimize their experience rat-
ings' and avoid potential liability under state and federal
antidiscrimination laws, few are willing to admit to having
discharged a worker because of her pregnancy. Employers are
naturally encouraged to dissemble and argue either that they
justifiably discharged the claimant or that the claimant
voluntarily quit.7 Whether the claimant quit or was fired
devolves into a question of credibility. Moreover, because preg-
nant claimants often bear the burden of proof and must over-
come a built-in alibi-"she quit because she is pregnant"-they
often face an uphill battle to make their case.
That pregnant claimants are wrongly denied unemployment
benefits is beyond question. The issues that remain are how
often this occurs and whether fine-tuning, as opposed to a
2. 423 U.S. 44 (1975). The Court held that a Utah law that made women
ineligible for unemployment compensation during the period surrounding childbirth
is unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
at 46.
3. Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-566,
§ 312, 90 Stat. 2667, 2679 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(12) (1994))
("[N]o person shall be denied compensation under... State law solely on the basis
of pregnancy.").
4. See Mary F. Radford, Wimberly and Beyond: Analyzing the Refusal to Award
Unemployment Compensation to Women Who Terminate Prior Employment Due to
Pregnancy, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 532, 577-79, 583-87 (1988).
5. See infra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
6. Most states charge employers an "experience-rated" tax which increases
according to the amount of unemployment that they have caused in the past.
ADVISORY COUNCIL ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE
IN THE UNITED STATES: BENEFITS, FINANCING, COVERAGE 73-76 (1995) [hereinafter
ACUC REPORT].
7. See id. at 87. "It is clear that the goal of increasing employer involvement
through experience rating has been achieved. The extent to which this is a positive
outcome, however, is disputed." Id.
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complete overhaul of the system, can eliminate the risk of
error. Given the limited resources of most claimants, the
burden of proof that they normally bear, the dynamics of the
workplace, agency bias in favor of employers, gender bias, and
concern over fiscal austerity, the number of improperly dis-
qualified pregnant claimants is likely to be large. Thus, preg-
nant workers suffer a serious risk of losing legitimate claims
for benefits.
Even if the current model worked and properly screened out
undeserving pregnant workers, however, the result still would
not be neutral. Women earn less and ascend less rapidly in the
business world than do their male counterparts8 because they
are more likely to have an interrupted work history.9 Professor
Samuel Issacharoff and Elyse Rosenblum note that "the most
significant factor causing the departure of women from the
work force is the 'birth effect,' which appears at early stages
of work force participation."I0 They argue for a systemic re-
sponse to gender-based discrimination in the workplace that
recognizes women's unique role in childbirth. Issacharoff and
Rosenblum note that although "Itihe simplest model to provide
for maternity benefits is a governmental program funded
through general revenues ... [tihere is little purpose in
suggesting benefits approaches. whose political viability ap-
proaches absolute zero."" Unemployment insurance therefore
provides the more realistic alternative.
This Article argues that unemployment insurance presents
an optimal model for dealing with the plight of pregnant
workers. Workers who temporarily leave the labor force be-
cause of pregnancy should be granted unemployment benefits
on the same terms as workers who either are fired or have
8. See White Men Rule Corporate America, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 16,
1995, at 1A, 13A (reporting a study by the Glass Ceiling Commission which concluded
that women make up less than 5% of senior managers). The Glass Ceiling Com-
mission was created to study the underrepresentation of women and minorities in
upper-level management positions. See Glass Ceiling Act of 1991, tit. II, Pub. L. No.
102-166, 105 Stat. 1081, 1082, reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e app. at 535-38 (1994).
9. See Samuel Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum, Women and the Workplace:
Accommodating the Demands of Pregnancy, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 2154, 2164 (1994).
"[Yloung women are prone to leaving the work force altogether for an extended period
of time at a subsequent point in their employment .... ITihe greater likelihood of
women leaving the work force is highly correlated with an expected lower career-
wage profile." Id.
10. Id. (footnote omitted).
11. Id. at 2215.
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quit for good cause attributable to their employment. No
distinction should be drawn between a pregnant worker who
quits and a pregnant worker who is discharged. Ascribing
fault in cases involving pregnancy borders on the arbitrary
and at best results in a "he says, she says" hearing. The legal
presumption should be that a worker who leaves employment
while pregnant is entitled to the safety net of unemployment
insurance.
Part I of this Article contrasts different states' approaches
to pregnancy-related separations from work. Part II demon-
strates how these states treat pregnant claimants through a
case example. The Article traces this case's progress, from the
initial determination to its final dismissal at the state su-
preme court, and critiques the arguments that influenced the
final disposition. Part III makes arguments for and meets
arguments against expanding benefits coverage for all preg-
nancy-based separations. This Article concludes with a pro-
posal for a model unemployment insurance act that expands
benefits to protect pregnant claimants.
I. THE CURRENT LAW OF VOLUNTARY SEPARATIONS
Section 3304(a)(12) of the FUTA states that "no person shall
be denied [unemployment] compensation ... solely on the
basis of pregnancy or termination of pregnancy." 2 In Wimberly
v. Labor and Industrial Relations Commission," the United
States Supreme Court was asked to decipher the meaning of
this provision: Was it meant to guarantee unemployment ben-
efits to pregnant claimants who voluntarily leave work, or was
it meant to insure that pregnant claimants are not treated
differently from other claimants? The claimant in Wimberly,
pursuant to company policy, had taken an unpaid maternity
leave without any guarantee of future reinstatement.' 4 Follow-
ing childbirth, the claimant returned to work only to find that
her job was no longer available. At this point she applied for
unemployment benefits, claiming that she was entitled to
12. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(12) (1994).
13. 479 U.S. 511 (1987). See generally Mark D. Esterle, Working Women's Woes
Under Wimberly, 71 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 710 (1987) (describing the effect of
Wimberly on pregnant workers).
14. 479 U.S. at 513.
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compensation for the period after she had offered her services
to her employer but was not rehired. The state unemployment
agency denied her claim,'5 as did the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri, which ruled that a claimant is not entitled to benefits
after leaving work "for reasons that, while perhaps legitimate
and necessary from a personal standpoint, [are] not causally
connected to the claimant's work or employer." 16 This ruling
did not violate § 3304(a)(12) because it denied benefits to all
claimants who left work for reasons unconnected to their
employment. Rather than requiring preferential treatment,
the court concluded, § 3304(a)(12) only prohibits discrimina-
tion against pregnancy.
17
The United States Supreme Court affirmed. In a unanimous
decision, 8 the Court concluded that § 3304(a)(12) was intend-
ed merely to prohibit the unequal treatment of pregnant work-
ers, not to insure that all discharges during pregnancy result
in an award of unemployment benefits. 9 The Court observed:
Most States regard leave on account of pregnancy as a
voluntary termination for good cause. Some of these States
have specific statutory provisions enumerating pregnancy-
motivated termination as good cause for leaving a job,
while others, by judicial or administrative decision, treat
pregnancy as encompassed within larger categories of good
cause such as illness or compelling personal reasons. A few
States, however, ... have chosen to define "leaving for
good cause" narrowly. In these States, all persons who
leave their jobs are disqualified from receiving benefits
unless they leave for reasons directly attributable to the
work or to the employer.2 °
The Court's survey of state law leaves one with the mistaken
impression that pregnancy is compensable under the unem-
ployment insurance laws of most states. Nothing could be
15. Id. The trial court and the Missouri Court of Appeals concluded that the
agency's decision conflicted with § 3304(a)(12). Id. at 513-14.
16. Wimberly v. Labor and Indus. Relations Comm'n, 688 S.W.2d 344, 346 (Mo.
1985), affd, 479 U.S. 511 (1987).
17. Id. at 349.
18. Wimberly, 479 U.S. at 511. Justice Blackmun did not participate in this
decision.
19. Id. at 522.
20. Id. at 515-16 (footnotes omitted).
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further from the truth. Nine jurisdictions have determined,
either by legislation2 ' or by court decree,22 that pregnancy
alone does not qualify a woman for unemployment benefits.
The reasons vary, but more often than not pregnant claimants
are denied benefits because state unemployment insurance
laws require that good cause be attributable to23 or connected
with2' employment. Because pregnancy is not normally attrib-
utable to employment or the employer, claimants are denied
benefits regardless of whether pregnancy otherwise amounts
to good cause.
Twelve additional states, though not specifically addressing
pregnancy, require that good cause be attributable to employ-
ment. 25 These jurisdictions presumably do not compensate
21. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-236(a)(2)(A) (West 1987 & Supp. 1995) ("left
suitable work voluntarily and without sufficient cause connected with [the] work");
D.C. CODE ANN. § 46-111(a) (1981 & Supp. 1995) (good cause must be "connected with
the work"); id. § 46-111(h) ("The eligibility of any individual, who is or has recently
been pregnant,. . . shall be determined under the same standards and procedures as
for any other claimant."); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 820, para. 405/601 (Smith-Hurd 1993)
(ineligible if leaving is voluntary and without good cause attributable to "the
employing unit"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1601(1)(a) (West Supp. 1995) ("good cause
attributable to a substantial change made to the employment by the employer");
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 421.29(1)(a) (West 1995) (ineligible if left work "voluntarily
without good cause"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 282-A:32(I)(a) (Supp. 1995) (requiring
good cause); accord S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-35-120(1) (Law. Co-op. 1986); S.D. CODIFIED
LAws ANN. § 61-6-13 (1993); cf. also id. § 61-6-3 (repealing provision that allowed
benefits for pregnancy); W. VA. CODE § 21A-6-3 (1989 & Supp. 1995) (ineligible if left
"voluntarily without good cause involving fault on the part of the employer").
22. See Finik v. Department of Employment Sec., 524 N.E.2d 1148 (Ill. Ct. App.
1988) (denying benefits to a claimant who failed to show that her pregnancy provided
good cause to quit); Martin Mills v. Department of Employment Sec., 391 So. 2d 56
(La. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that pregnancy is not connected with employment);
Taylor v. United States Postal Serv., 413 N.W.2d 736 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (holding
that a claimant is not available if on maternity leave); Watson v. Murdock's Food &
Wet Goods, 385 N.W.2d 693 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that pregnancy is not
attributable to employment); Kurowski v. Department of Employment Sec., 219 A.2d
281 (N.H. 1966) (holding that pregnancy is not good cause). But cf. Brown v. Porcher,
660 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1981) (holding that denial of benefits to claimants who
voluntarily quit because of pregnancy contravenes federal law), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1150 (1983); Fragmin v. Gatson, 383 S.E.2d 84, 86-87 (W. Va. 1989) (suggesting that
a pregnancy that is "so aggravating or complicating" may qualify an otherwise
ineligible employee for benefits because the separation would not be considered
voluntary).
23. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 820, para. 405/601 (Smith-Hurd 1993); Finik, 524
N.E.2d at 1155.
24. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-236(b)(1) (Supp. 1995).
25. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-775(1) (1995); FLA. STAT. ch. 443. 101(1)(a) (1995);
GA. CODE ANN. § 34-8-194(1) (1992 & Supp. 1995); IDAHO CODE § 72-1366(e) (1989 &
Supp. 1995); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 341.370(1)(c) (Michie 1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 26, § 1193(1)(A) (West 1988 & Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. § 268.09(a) (1992 & Supp.
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pregnancy-related separations because of the lack of a connec-
tion between pregnancy and employment. Excluding pregnancy
from unemployment compensation coverage is permissible so
long as all other nonoccupational illnesses and disabilities are
likewise excluded.26
Thirteen states allow unemployment benefits for employee-
initiated, pregnancy-related separations, at least under certain
circumstances.2 ' A small handful of these states allow
1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-5(a) (West 1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-1-7(A) (Michie
1993); OKLA. STAT. tit. 40, § 2-404 (1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1344(a)(2)(A)
(1987); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 108.04(7)(b) (West 1988). But cf. OKLA. STAT. tit. 40, § 2-414
(1991) (not disqualifying pregnancy that would otherwise qualify). I have not included
Maryland, which also requires that good cause be connected with employment, because
a claimant still qualifies in that state if she had "no reasonable alternative" to
quitting. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMP. § 8-1001(a), (c)(ii) (1991 & Supp. 1995).
26. Wimberlyv. Labor and Indus. Relations Comm'n, 479 U.S. 511,516-17 (1987).
Because occupational illnesses and disabilities are connected with employment, they
may support an award of unemployment benefits even in those jurisdictions that
maintain a restrictive "connection" requirement. A problem arises, however, in proving
that the claimant is "available" for work. If the disability renders the claimant unable
to perform any work at all, she may be excluded altogether. If, on the other hand, the
claimant is available to perform some other work, then she can recover unemployment
benefits. See, e.g., Paschke v. Retool Indus., 519 N.W.2d 441, 442-43 (Mich. 1994)
(suggesting that being disabled may be consistent with being "willing and able to
work"). If the claimant also receives worker's compensation, courts often offset this
against unemployment benefits. See, e.g., Ocean Manor Resort Hotel v. Garbalosa,
512 So. 2d 256, 257 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987). But see Wells v. Jones, 662 S.W.2d
849, 851 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983) (permitting no offset).
27. Compare ALA. CODE § 25-4-78(2)(a)(1) (1992 & Supp. 1995) (no disqualifica-
tion if employee is "sick or disabled," notifies employer, and offers to return "as soon
as... able to work") with Alabama Mills v. Carnley, 44 So. 2d 622, 626 (Ala. 1949)
(holding that an employee has good cause to leave work because of pregnancy and
qualifies for benefits once available to work). See also ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-10-513(b)
(Michie 1987) ("No individual shall be disqualified under this section .. .if, after
making reasonable efforts to preserve job rights, he left his last work because of
illness, injury, pregnancy, or other disability."); CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1256 (West
1986 & Supp. 1996) ("An individual is disqualified .. .if... she left ... her most
recent work voluntarily without good cause . . . ."); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 1256-
15(b) (1995) (leaving work because of pregnancy can be good cause). Compare COLO.
REV. STAT. § 8-73-108(4)(b)(I) (1986 & Supp. 1995) (entitled to full award if "[the
health of the worker is such that the worker is separated from ... her ... employ-
ment and must refrain from working") with Frontier Airlines v. Industrial Comm'n,
734 P.2d 142, 144 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the employer's mandatory
maternity leave policy constituted partial unemployment sufficient to entitle the
claimant to benefits), appeal dismissed, 738 P.2d 1185 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987). See also
IOWA CODE ANN. § 96.5(1)(d) (West 1984) (not disqualified if the individual "left
employment because of illness, injury or pregnancy upon the advice of a licensed and
practicing physician ... or the employer consented to the absence"). Compare MASS.
GEN. L. ch. 151A, § 25(e)(1) (1994) (no benefits for employee who has left "voluntarily
without good cause attributable to the employing unit") with Director of Div. of
Employment Sec. v. Fitzgerald, 414 N.E.2d 608, 610 (Mass. 1980) (refusing to apply
§ 25(e)(1) to female welder who left work because of her pregnancy). See also Mo.
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pregnant workers to quit or leave employment for medical
reasons and still qualify for, if not immediately receive, bene-
fits. Colorado, for example, provides benefits "to a worker who,
either voluntarily or involuntarily, is separated from employ-
ment because of pregnancy and who otherwise satisfies the
requirements [of the statute] .,28 Although this language in
isolation seems protective of pregnant workers, the availability
for work requirement in Colorado can postpone an award of
benefits until after childbirth.29
Similarly, Texas law provides that "an individual who is
available to work may not be disqualified for benefits because
the individual left work because of: (1) a medically verified
illness ... ; (2) injury; (3) disability; or (4) pregnancy."30 Preg-
nant workers in Texas thus may quit and receive benefits only
REV. STAT. § 288.050.1(1)(c) (1994) (eligible if employee was "forced to leave her work
because of pregnancy, notified employer of necessity as soon as practical under the
circumstances, and returned to that employer and offered her services ... as soon as
she was physically able to return to work ... but in no event later than ninety days
after the termination of the pregnancy"). Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-14(1) (1995)
(not disqualified if "an adequate disability or health condition ... existed to justify
... leaving," provided that "at a reasonable time prior to leaving, the individual gave
the employer notice of his disability or health condition") with Sellers v. National
Spinning Co., 307 S.E.2d 774, 776 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983) (denying benefits for leaving
work because of pregnancy unless the claimant intends to return to work and takes
"necessary minimal steps to preserve the employment relationship"), review denied,
311 S.E.2d 293 (S.C. 1984); compare N.Y. LAB. LAW § 593(1)(a) (McKinney 1988) (good
cause required) with Kryjak v. Ross, 384 N.Y.S.2d 888, 888-89 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976)
(holding that a pregnant claimant must seek work to be eligible for benefits) and
Garrow v. Levine, 382 N.Y.S.2d 588, 589 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976) (holding that preg-
nancy is good cause for leaving work); compare PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 802(b) (1991)
(voluntary quit because of a disability is "not a cause of a necessitous and compelling
nature" where the employer is able to provide other suitable work) with Stankiewicz
v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 548 A.2d 366, 368 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1988) (holding that a worker is not disqualified where she attempts to return after
maternity leave, and no suitable work is available). See also TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-7-
303(a)(1) (1991 & Supp. 1995) (a claimant who is separated for disability and
pregnancy leave remains eligible for benefits where notice is given to the employer
and claimant returns to work as soon as able); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 207.045(d)(4)
(West Supp. 1996). I have also included Kentucky in this category because of Piper
v. Singer Co., 663 S.W.2d 761, 764-65 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984), which suggests that a
pregnant worker can quit on the advice of her doctor and recover unemployment
benefits. However, the opinion appears difficult to justify under Kentucky's unem-
ployment insurance statute, which requires that good cause be attributable to the
employment. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 341.370(1)(c) (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1994).
28. COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-73-108(4)(b)(I) (1986 & Supp. 1995).
29. A factor in this determination is whether the claimant is physically unable
to perform work. Id. § 8-73-108(4)(j). In addition, a claimant who refuses suitable
work is automatically disqualified for 20 weeks. Id. § 8-73-108(5)(a). Thus, the key
to benefits is availability. Benefits are likely to be interrupted at some point during
pregnancy and not continued until after childbirth.
30. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 207.045(d) (West Supp. 1996).
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if quitting is medically necessary and only so long as they
otherwise remain available to work.
The remaining states that allow an immediate award of
unemployment benefits to pregnant claimants do so in a
fashion similar to Colorado and Texas.3" A pregnant claimant
must remain available and able to work in order to receive
benefits,32 a difficult standard to meet if the pregnancy-related
separation must also be medically necessary.33 The result is
that unemployment benefits are usually only available post-
partum.
The most common approach among those states that do not
disqualify voluntary, pregnancy-related separations provides
31. California, for example, allows benefits
if a reasonable person genuinely desirous of remaining employed would have
left work due to an undue risk of injury or illness caused by health reasons,...
[or] pregnancy, ... and the claimant has taken reasonable steps under the
circumstances to preserve the employment relationship such as seeking sick
leave where health factors are involved, or other leave, if available, or a transfer
to other available work the claimant can perform.
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 1256-15(b) (1995).
Furthermore, California's regulations specifically address pregnancy. These regula-
tions state:
If a claimant's leaving work is voluntary due to pregnancy, the leaving is with
good cause if pregnancy rendered the claimant unable to continue work. This
is usually established by a physician's advice but is also present if a claimant
has a history of miscarriages or difficult pregnancies, or if there is a threat to
the health or safety of the fetus, or if objective factors exist such as heavy lifting
or other strenuous tasks which are required in the work.
Id. § 1256-15(d)(3). These provisions allow unemployment benefits only if the
separation from employment is both medically necessary and the claimant remains
available to do other work. A claimant who leaves work because of pregnancy in
California will often file for disability benefits rather than unemployment benefits.
See infra notes 38, 40 and accompanying text.
32. See Richard McHugh & Ingrid Kock, Unemployment Insurance: Responding
to the Expanding Role of Women in the Work Force, 27 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1422,
1424 (1994) ("All states have unemployment statutes that require that claimants be
available for work.") (footnote omitted). The availability requirement might be a
federal mandate. See infra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
33. The most common case involves a pregnant worker who quits because of the
physically strenuous nature of the employment but remains available to perform
lighter work. See, e.g., Director of Div. of Employment Sec. v. Fitzgerald, 414 N.E.2d
608, 610-11 (Mass. 1980) (awarding unemployment benefits to a welder who quit
after being refused maternity leave but was still available to perform lighter work);
see also Piper v. Singer Co., 663 S.W.2d 761, 764-65 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984) (suggesting
that benefits should be available to pregnant workers who leave work because of
medical necessity).
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unemployment benefits only after childbirth, once the mother
again makes herself available for employment.34 For example,
in response to Wimberly, Missouri amended its unemployment
insurance law so as not to disqualify a claimant who
presents evidence supported by competent medical proof
that she was forced to leave her work because of pregnancy,
notified her employer of such necessity as soon as practical
under the circumstances, and returned to that employer
and offered her services to that employer as soon as she
was physically able to return to work, as certified by a
licensed and practicing physician, but in no event later
than ninety days after the termination of the pregnancy.
35
34. Compare ALA. CODE § 25-4-78(2)(a)(1), (4) (1992 & Supp. 1995) (no disqualifi-
cation if"sick or disabled," have notified employer, and offer to return "as soon as...
able to work") with Alabama Mills, Inc. v. Carnley, 44 So. 2d 622, 626 (Ala. 1949)
(holding that a woman has good cause to leave because of pregnancy and qualifies for
benefits once available to work). See also ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-10-513(b) (Michie
1987) ("No individual shall be disqualified under this section . . . if, after making
reasonable efforts to preserve job rights, he left his last work because of illness,
injury, pregnancy, or other disability."); IOWA CODE § 96.5(1)(d) (1983) (not disquali-
fied if "forced to leave her work because of pregnancy ... and returned to that
employer... as soon as she was physically able to return to work"); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 288.050(1)(1)(c) (1994) (not disqualified if"left employment because of... pregnan-
cy... and after recovering from the .. . pregnancy, ... work was not available").
Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-14(1) (1995) (not disqualified if claimant "leaves work
due solely to a disability ... or other health condition" provided that "at a reasonable
time prior to leaving, the individual gave the employer notice of his disability or
health condition") with Sellers v. National Spinning Co., 307 S.E.2d 774, 776 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1983) (requiring claimants to take steps "to preserve the employment
relationship" in order to qualify for benefits). See also TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-7-
303(a)(1) (Supp. 1995) (claimant not disqualified because of disability or pregnancy
where notice is given to employer and claimant returns to work as soon as able). But
compare PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 802(b) (1991) (no disqualification where "necessitous
and compelling ... [pirovided, [t]hat a voluntary leaving work because of a disability
if the employer is able to provide other suitable work, shall be deemed not a cause
of a necessitous and compelling nature") with Stankiewicz v. Pennsylvania Compen-
sation Bd. of Review, 548 A.2d 366 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988) (holding that a worker is
not disqualified where she attempts to return after maternity leave and no suitable
work is available).
35. Mo. REV. STAT. § 288.050(1)(1)(c) (1994) (applicable to claims filed after
December 31, 1988). The exact period covered by the unemployment benefits is
uncertain under this particular provision. One might argue that after satisfying the
stated conditions the claimant should receive benefits retroactive to the date of
separation. Because the claimant is not able to work or available for work, however,
she cannot be found eligible for benefits for the weeks prior to her offer to return to
work. See id. § 288.040(1)(1).
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Similarly, Iowa's unemployment compensation law provides
that no disqualification will occur if
[t]he individual left employment because of illness, injury
or pregnancy upon the advice of a licensed and practicing
physician, and upon knowledge of the necessity for absence
immediately notified the employer, or the employer con-
sented to the absence, and after recovering from the ill-
ness, injury or pregnancy, . . . the individual returned to
the employer and offered to perform services and the
individual's regular work or comparable suitable work was
not available, if so found by the department, provided the
individual is otherwise eligible.3"
Provisions such as those of Missouri and Iowa have the same
effect as unpaid disability leave statutes, which require the
employer to rehire the previously disabled worker. The
employer's failure to rehire the worker is considered the
36. IOWA CODE § 96.5(1)(d) (1983). One might argue that, under Iowa law, the
claimant is entitled to benefits during maternity leave. In Butts v. Iowa Department
of Job Service, 328 N.W.2d 515, 516 (Iowa 1983), the claimant quit work because of
pregnancy, delivered her baby, and then offered to return to work. Because her
employer refused to rehire her, the unemployment agency began paying benefits as
of the date of the employer's refusal. Id. The claimant then sued to recover benefits
for the period after she quit work and before her employer refused to rehire her. Id.
The agency argued that it had denied benefits to the claimant during her maternity
leave because she failed to follow strictly the requirements of§ 96.5(1)(d). She did not
submit medical proof when she left, nor did she submit evidence or certification of
recovery from her doctor until five months after delivery, and she did not offer to
return until five months after delivery. Id. at 517. The court noted in affirming the
denial of benefits that "[t]hese failures were the [agency's] sole basis for denying
benefits." Id.
It seems odd that the agency relied on these alleged procedural defaults to deny
benefits during the claimant's maternity leave, unless § 96.5(1)(d) was intended to
confer benefits during maternity leave as well as after when the claimant is refused
further employment. See Radford, supra note 4, at 568 n.269. Because the agency
awarded benefits to the claimant after the employer refused to reinstate her,
however, its reliance on alleged procedural defaults is not convincing. If the defaults
precluded benefits during maternity leave, they just as easily could have precluded
them after the claimant's return to work. The only sensible explanation for the
agency's action is that it interpreted § 96.5(1)(d) to permit benefits only after the
employer rejects the mother's offer to return to work. The court's example in Butts
seems to corroborate this interpretation: "[Under the statute a woman who works
until the week before delivery (leaving on her doctor's advice), and returns four weeks
later (with a doctor's approval) will then receive benefits if she is denied re-employ-
ment." 328 N.W.2d at 517-18.
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equivalent of a discharge, entitling the claimant to unemploy-
ment benefits."7
Five states" and Puerto Rico39 have established mechanisms
whereby disabled workers, though not qualifying for unem-
ployment benefits, receive temporary disability payments
during their separation from employment. California, for
instance, provides temporary assistance to those unable to
work because of "[ililness or injury, whether physical or men-
tal, including any illness or injury resulting from pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical condition."4 ° Rhode Island simi-
larly provides disability benefits to "an otherwise eligible
individual who is unemployed due to sickness resulting from
pregnancy, childbirth, miscarriage or abortion."4
Additionally, at least five other states do not disqualify
workers who separate from their employment because of non-
occupational disabilities.42 These states presumably also allow
37. Note that a question arises with the recent adoption of the Family and
Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 2601-2654 (1994)). The Act provides that employees of private-sector employers,
employing 50 or more employees, who have worked for 12 continuous months, are
entitled to 12 weeks unpaid leave during certain family emergencies. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 2612(a)(1). Refusals to abide by this federal policy are unlawful, and employees
have a private right of action against the employer for violations. See id. § 2617(a).
The question is whether an employer's refusal to grant this statutorily required
unpaid leave necessarily amounts to good cause attributable to employment which
would justify a voluntary separation. If so, then the employer's refusal to grant
unpaid maternity leave should result in an award of unemployment benefits under
even the most draconian state unemployment laws, at least post-partum when the
mother is again "available" to work.
38. See CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 2626 (West 1986 & Supp. 1996); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 392-21 (1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-25 (West 1991); N.Y. WORK. COMP.
LAW § 209 (McKinney 1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-41-8 (1995).
39. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 467 (1995). Puerto Rico requires employers to pay
the claimant half the wages that she would otherwise have earned for an eight week
period. Id.
40. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 2626(b)(1).
41. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-41-8(a).
42. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 3315(1) (1995) ("[Ihf an individual has left work
involuntarily because of illness, no disqualification shall prevail after the individual
becomes able to work."); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-706(a)(1) (1993) ("An individual shall
not be disqualified ... if... forced to leave work because of illness or injury upon the
advice of a licensed and practicing health care provider and, upon learning of the
necessity for absence, immediately notified the employer thereof, or the employer
consented to the absence, and after recovery from the illness or injury ... the
individual returned to the employer and offered to perform services and the individ-
ual's regular work or comparable and suitable work was not available."); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 39-51-2302(2) (1995) (no disqualification if the claimant left employment
"because of personal illness or injury. . . upon the advice of a licensed and practicing
physician and, after recovering from his illness or injury.., returned to his employer
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unemployment benefits for pregnancy-related disabilities, at
least once the claimant can reestablish her availability to
work. Indiana, for example, provides that "[an individual
whose unemployment is the result of medically substantiated
physical disability and who is involuntarily unemployed after
having made reasonable efforts to maintain the employment
relationship shall not be subject to disqualification."43
Thirteen jurisdictions do not address pregnancy, do not
explicitly provide for disability leave, and do not require a con-
nection between good cause and employment." Four of these
states likely would hold that disability or illness amounts to
good cause under certain circumstances.45 Because the FUTA
and offered his service and his regular or comparable suitable work was not avail-
able"); WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(2)(b) (1994) (no disqualification where "[the
separation was because of the illness or disability of the claimant ... if the claimant
took all reasonable precautions ... to protect his or her employment status by having
promptly notified the employer of the reason for the absence and by having promptly
requested reemployment when again able to assume employment"); Wyo. STAT. § 27-
3-311(a)(i) (1991) (disqualified if claimant left work "voluntarily without good cause
attributable directly to his employment, except for bona fide medical reasons"); cf
MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMP. § 8-1001(c)(ii) (Supp. 1995) (good cause can be unrelat-
ed to employment if "of such necessitous or compelling nature that the individual has
no reasonable alternative other than leaving employment").
43. IND. CODE ANN. § 22-4-15-1(c)(2) (West Supp. 1995).
44. ALASKA STAT. § 23.20.379(a)(1) (1990) ("left . .. work voluntarily without
good cause"); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMP. § 8-1001(a)(1), (c)(1)(iii) (Supp. 1995) (good
cause must be connected to employment, except where there is "no reasonable
alternative" but to quit); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-628 (1993) ("without good cause");
accord NEV. REV. STAT. § 612.380 (1991); see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4141.29
(Anderson 1995) ("involuntary"); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 704(b) (1995) ("good
cause"); accord R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-44-17 (1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 60.2-618(1)
(Michie 1992); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 304(b)(2) (1993); see also infra note 45
(discussing the laws of the remaining four states).
45. Mississippi provides that a claimant must have "good cause" for voluntarily
leaving employment and expressly excepts from good cause "marital, filial and
domestic circumstances and obligations." MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-5-513A(1)(a) (1995).
The statute then exempts pregnancy from this exception. Id. By negative implication,
one might argue that pregnancy amounts to good cause.
Utah provides that "[a] claimant shall not be denied eligibility for benefits if the
claimant leaves work under circumstances of such a nature that it would be contrary
to equity and good conscience to impose a disqualification." UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-4-
405(1)(b) (1994). It has been suggested that illness falls into this exception. See
Champlin Petroleum Co. v. Department of Employment Sec., 744 P.2d 330 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987) (affirming a determination that mental illness is not just cause for
dismissal).
An Attorney General Opinion in Hawaii states that separation because of disabil-
ity or "domestic reason" might amount to "good cause" within the meaning of HAW.
REV. STAT. § 383-30(1) (1993) if the employer cannot show otherwise. Op. Att'y Gen.
No. 60-112 (Haw. 1960).
Finally, the Oregon Court of Appeals has found that disability might satisfy the
state's good cause requirement under OR. REV. STAT. § 657.176(2)(c) (1995). Pacific
Northwest Bell Tel. v. Employment Div., 588 P.2d 654, 655 (Or. Ct. App. 1978).
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mandates equal treatment, these states should also make
unemployment benefits available for pregnancy leave, at least
to the extent that pregnancy makes the separation from
employment medically necessary.4 The requirement that
workers remain available for work, however, would likely
prevent an expectant mother from recovering unemployment
benefits until after childbirth.4 v To the extent that they allow
benefits to these claimants, these states fall into a model
similar to that in Colorado and Texas."
From this brief description of unemployment compensation
law in the United States, one learns that maternity leave in
the vast majority of jurisdictions does not result in an award
of unemployment benefits. Twenty-one states consider preg-
nancy to be unrelated to employment and noncompensable.
The bulk of states provide unemployment benefits either only
after childbirth once the claimant's former employer has re-
fused re-employment, or during the period that the claimant
is unable to perform her current job because of the pregnancy
but is still available to perform some other work. Because such
circumstances occur only occasionally, the result is that unem-
ployment benefits are paid in these states, if at all, only post-
partum.
II. DISCHARGE AND DISSEMBLE
Employers have a natural incentive to bend facts in order to
avoid unemployment compensation awards. Most states use an
experience-rated system to tax employers, which raises an
employer's tax rates according to the number of compensable
claims for which they are liable.4 s In order to avoid higher tax
rates, employers very often challenge claims to unemployment
insurance benefits by asserting that the employee quit
46. See 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(12) (1994).
47. See, e.g., Sellers v. National Spinning Co., 307 S.E.2d 774, 776 (N.C. Ct. App.
1983) (holding that pregnancy does not necessitate benefits unless the claimant is
available to return to work).
48. A pregnant worker in one of these jurisdictions conceivably could be awarded
unemployment benefits immediately after leaving work if she is unable to perform
her usual work but is still available to perform "lighter" or different work. See supra
notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
49. ACUC REPORT, supra note 6, at 43.
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voluntarily. As demonstrated in Part I of this Article, this
argument proves successful in many states. A woman who
voluntarily quits because of her pregnancy, even when medi-
cally necessary, cannot recover benefits in almost half of the
states.50
Although anecdotes seldom sustain an argument, they can
identify a problem. The following anecdote involves a preg-
nant worker caught in a web of private-sector pregnancy
discrimination and public-sector bureaucratic malaise. It il-
lustrates the plight of many working women. Unlike their
male counterparts who need not quit work to start a family,
women often must choose between pregnancy and employ-
ment.
A. Brown v. Kentucky Unemployment
Insurance Commission
Prior to becoming pregnant in early 1992, Jenny Brown
51
was employed for approximately two years by Craig Mueller,
a chiropractor in Louisville, Kentucky. In July 1992,
Brown's employment with Mueller was reduced to part-time
status, in part, because she informed Mueller that she ex-
pected to take maternity leave.53 In response to Brown's
complaint about her reduction in hours, Mueller advised
Brown that "if she were going to file a discrimination
complaint ... he wanted her resignation."54 Brown then quit
her job in response to Mueller's demand and applied for
unemployment insurance benefits later that day.55 Mueller
50. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
51. Jenny Brown is my sister-in-law. I assisted in preparing and arguing Ms.
Brown's case before the Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission, the Jef-
ferson Circuit Court, and the Kentucky Court of Appeals.
52. Referee Decision, Brown v. Mueller, AD No. 92-7696A, at 1 (Ky. Div. of
Unemployment Ins., Dep't for Employment Servs. Sept. 15, 1992) (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
53. See id. at 1-2.
54. Order, Brown v. Mueller, AD No. 92-7696A, at 1 (Ky. Unemployment Ins.
Comm'n Nov. 9, 1992) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform).
55. Referee Decision, Brown, AD No. 92-7696A, at 2. Brown also pursued a state-
law pregnancy discrimination claim against Mueller for pregnancy discrimination and
ultimately prevailed. Eighteen months after first receiving the complaint, the
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contested the claim, arguing that Brown had voluntarily and
inexplicably quit.
Because Kentucky's unemployment insurance law provides
that voluntary separations from employment are compensable
only if supported by "good cause attributable to the employ-
ment,"56 Brown would be disqualified from receiving benefits
notwithstanding her pregnancy if the local Division of Unem-
ployment Insurance believed Mueller's defense. On September
10, 1992, six weeks after her separation, a hearing was held
on Brown's unemployment insurance claim. Five days later,
the referee denied Brown's claim for unemployment benefits.5"
The referee entered the following findings:
On April 17 [Brown] informed Dr. Mueller that she was
pregnant and that her child was due on December 19.
Later, she indicated to Dr. Mueller her intent to leave her
employment with the birth of her child, expressing the
hope that later she could return to work there on a part-
time basis. That notice of intent to leave her employment
played a part in Dr. Mueller's decision ... that effective
August 3, claimant would revert to part-time status work-
ing five hours a day, three days a week. The principal
reasons [sic] for this however was that [the] office staff
was to [be] reorganized which included the hiring of an
administrative assistant in the office .... [Tihe adminis-
trative assistant to be hired would be taking on some of
claimant's duties.
It is claimant's understanding that Dr. Mueller's wife,
Lynne, was office manager ... [oin the same day she
received [notice of Mueller's decision, claimant] tele-
phon[ed] Ms. Mueller at home to express her displeasure
at being reduced to part time work.
Irritated at what he called claimant's going behind his
back, Dr. Mueller sent her a memo to clarify the situation:
Kentucky Human Relations Commission found probable cause to proceed against
Mueller. This action eventually lead to a cash settlement. See Conciliation Agree-
ment, Brown v. Mueller Chiropractic, No. C93-E2967, at 2 (Louisville & Ky. Human
Relations Comm'n Mar. 17, 1994) (withdrawing EEOC Complaint No. 241-93-0202)
(on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
56. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 341.370(1)(c) (Michie 1994).
57. Referee Decision, Brown, AD No. 92-7696A, at 3.
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that his decision she would now work part-time was final
and not negotiable. [In] communications between them
thereafter... Dr. Mueller expressed his concern as to
claimant's commitment as an employee with her reluctant
acceptance at [sic] her upcoming reassignment and that he
would be uncomfortable if, . . . as she had suggested, she
might file a discrimination complaint against him .... [H]e
told her that he would consider continuing to work full-time
but that this would likely require a reduction of her hourly
pay rate .... She left the office shortly thereafter and filed
her application for unemployment benefits later that day.5"
Based on these findings, the referee ruled that Brown
left this suitable work voluntarily without good cause ....
The employer's intent to reduce [her] to part-time work
... was based on legitimate business needs and concerns
and not because she was pregnant .... It has been ruled
consistently by the Unemployment Insurance Commission
in this type [of] case that a quitting because of reduced
hours of work is a disqualifying quitting without good
cause. Beyond that, claimant was on notice at the last that
her employer was willing to consider allowing her to con-
tinue working full-time, she electing to leave before fully
and fairly exploring that reasonable alternative to quitting.
A worker does not have good cause to leave if there are
reasonable alternatives to loss of employment.59
Brown appealed the referee's decision to the Kentucky
Unemployment Commission which, on November 9, 1992,
almost four months after Brown's separation, ruled that she
was entitled to benefits.6 ° Although the Commission accepted
the bulk of the referee's factual findings, it added:
Dr. Mueller told claimant that if she were going to file a
discrimination complaint against him, then he wanted her
58. Id. at 1-2.
59. Id. at 2-3.
60. Order, Brown v. Mueller, AD No. 92-7696A, at 1 (Ky. Unemployment Ins.
Comm'n Nov. 9, 1992) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform).
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resignation. During this same conversation, the possibility
of claimant continuing to work full-time was discussed.
However, it was clear that her wages were going to be
reduced an undetermined amount, but substantially more
than ... if she were permitted to work full-time. Believing
that such a reduction in pay would be discriminatory,
claimant still planned on filing a discrimination complaint
even if she were permitted to work full-time. Therefore,
claimant quit her employment in response to Dr. Mueller's
statement that if she were going to file a discrimination
complaint then he wanted her resignation.... Further, by
forcing claimant to choose between her employment and
filing a discrimination complaint, Dr. Mueller created a
work environment so onerous and burdensome that claim-
ant had no reasonable alternative but to quit her employ-
ment.6 '
Mueller did not appeal this award.
Between the time she left Mueller's employment and the
November award, Brown received no unemployment benefits.62
Because of her pregnancy and the financial constraints placed
on her family, Brown accepted a temporary, part-time position
with Dr. Louis Heuser in mid-October 1992.63 She worked in
this office until she learned that the Commission had awarded
her benefits.64 Because of the award, her pregnancy, and the
job's part-time nature and lower pay, Brown did not intend to
return to the office after November 12.65 She delivered her
baby on December 18, 1992.
On March 17, 1993, the Division of Unemployment Services
redetermined that Brown was disqualified from receiving
future benefits and that she would have to repay benefits
61. Id. at 1-2.
62. See Brown v. Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, No. 93-CI-04113, slip
op. at 1 (Ky. Dist. Ct. Jefferson County Feb. 2, 1994) (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal ofLaw Reform), rev'd, Nos. 94-CA-519-MR, 94-CA-605-MR (Ky. Ct.
App. June 23, 1995), motion for review denied, No. 95-SC-587-D (Ky. Dec. 14, 1995).
63. Id. at 2.
64. Referee Decision, Brown v. Heuser, AD No. 92-07696BA, at 2 (Ky. Div. of
Unemployment Ins., Dep't for Employment Servs. May 26, 1993) (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). Ms. Brown informed the Unemploy-
ment Commission in writing, through its local office, of all income that she had
received while working in this office, and corresponding deductions were made from
the benefits that she later received. Id.
65. Id.
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retroactive to November 12, her last day of work in the physi-
cian's office.66 The reasons for the disqualification were her
voluntary termination of employment and her failure to report
this separation to the Division. Brown contested the determi-
nation, and a hearing was held on May 20, 1993.67 Six days
later, the referee ruled again against Brown, concluding that
Brown "voluntarily left the employer without good cause
attributable to the employment" and that the employment was
suitable notwithstanding its part-time nature.68 Additionally,
the referee found that Brown had refused full-time employ-
ment, a conclusion based on Brown's failure to prove the
opposite. The referee found against Brown on this issue be-
cause "the testimony between claimant and the employer's
office manager on this determinative point is at equipoise, and
because claimant bears the burden of proof [,which] she has
not overcome."
69
Brown again appealed to the Commission and argued that:
(1) the hearing officer incorrectly saddled her with the burden
of proof; (2) even full-time employment in the physician's office
was not suitable because it paid substantially less than did
her prior job; and (3) she did not formally quit until after her
daughter's birth on December 18, meaning that her disqualifi-
cation should only have occurred, if at all, over a month
later.7 1 On July 30, 1993, the Commission affirmed the refer-
ee's decision, concluding that: (1) the referee correctly assigned
the burden of proof to Brown; (2) Brown was disqualified for
quitting, even though the work that she quit was part-time
work that paid substantially less than her prior employment;
and (3) her disqualification began upon her last day of work,
November 12, and not when she formally quit.71 Whether
66. Id. at 1-2.
67. Id. at 1.
68. Id. at 2-3.
69. Id. at 3.
70. Brief for Jenny G. Brown at 1-5, 11-12, Brown v. Heuser (Ky. Unemploy-
ment Ins. Comm'n July 30, 1993) (AD No. 92-07696BA) (on file with the University
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). Brown's second employer assumed that she was
on maternity leave during this period and would return to work following childbirth.
See Referee Decision, Brown, AD No. 92-07696BA, at 2. If the referee had accepted
this third argument, Brown might have retained one month of benefits.
71. Cf Order, Brown v. Heuser, AD No. 92-07696BA, at 2 (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) ("When a worker has quit employ-
ment the burden of proof is upon the worker to show good cause attributable to the
employment for doing so. The burden shifts to the employer in a discharge issue.").
FALL 1995-WINTER 1996]
60 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 29:1&2
Brown was obligated to accept part-time work in the first
instance and whether even full-time employment resulted in
substantially reduced wages were not considered.72 Moreover,
in response to the argument that Brown did not quit until she
notified her employer, the Commission stated:
Even if we were to rule, as counsel now argues, that [the]
claimant did not quit until she failed to return to work
after her baby was born, we would also rule that she was
on a maternity leave, and not eligible for benefits ...
during the duration of that leave.73
Brown's subsequent appeal to the Jefferson Circuit Court
proved successful. On February 2, 1994, the court reversed the
Commission's ruling because it found that the law "makes it
clear that in a disqualification case ... it is the employer who
must bear the burden [of proofi." The court did not reach any
of the other issues raised by Brown, finding that they had
become moot.
75
The Commission appealed to the Kentucky Court of Appeals,
arguing that the burden of proof should have been placed on
Brown to show that she had good cause to quit.76 Brown cross-
appealed, asserting that quitting unsuitable employment does
not disqualify an otherwise eligible claimant from receiving
benefits.7 7 The Kentucky Court of Appeals ruled for the Com-
mission on both points: first, it concluded that Brown properly
72. Cf id. ("Here there was no reduction in wages unilaterally enforced by the
employer; claimant merely accepted new work at less per hour and on a part-time
basis.").
73. Id.
74. Brown v. Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, No. 93-CI-04113, slip op.
at 4-5 (Ky. Dist. Ct. Jefferson County Feb. 2, 1994).(on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (citing Brown Hotel v. Edwards, 365 S.W.2d 299
(Ky. 1963)), rev'd, Nos. 94-CA-519-MR, 94-CA-605-MR (Ky. Ct. App. June 23, 1995),
motion for review denied, No. 95-SC-587-D (Ky. Dec. 14, 1995).
75. Id. at 5.
76. Brief for Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission at 3-4, Brown v.
Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm'n (Ky. Ct. App. June 23, 1995) (Nos. 94-CA-519-
MR, 94-CA-605-MR) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
The Commission also argued that Brown should be disqualified for making allegedly
false statements to the Commission. See id. at 7. Because the lower court did not find
it necessary to decide this issue, the court of appeals did not address it. See Brown,
Nos. 94-CA-519-MR, 94-CA-605-MR, at 3-4 (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform).
77. Brief for the Appellee/Cross-Appellant, at 10, Brown (Nos. 94-CA-519-MR, 94-
CA-605-MR) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
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bore the burden of proving that she was not disqualified from
receiving benefits; 8 next, it held that because Brown had ac-
cepted intervening employment, she "[was] precluded from
now claiming that the employment ... was unsuitable and,
hence, that she was entitled to quit that employment without
being disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits."7 9
B. Critique of Brown v. Kentucky Unemployment
Insurance Commission
Jenny Brown's case exposes serious flaws in what should be
a gender-neutral compensation system. First, the strong bu-
reaucratic preference for "managerial prerogatives" and "busi-
ness needs" often overcomes empathy for pregnant workers.
The referee in Brown v. Mueller, for example, concluded as a
factual matter that Brown's demotion was motivated, in part,
by her impending maternity leave. 0 As a legal matter, how-
ever, rather than simply recognize that the causal connection
between Brown's demotion and pregnancy rendered Mueller's
decision unlawful,8 ' the referee rationalized that "legitimate
78. Brown, Nos. 94-CA-519-MR, 94-CA-605-MR, at 6-7.
79. Id. at 7.
80. See Referee Decision, Brown v. Mueller, AD No. 92-7696A, at 1 (Ky. Div. of
Unemployment Ins., Dep't for Employment Servs. Sept. 15, 1992) (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
81. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994), prohibits
adverse employment decisions based on pregnancy for businesses with 15 or more
employees. Because Mueller had fewer than 15 employees, his actions were not illegal
under federal law, but still violated state law. Kentucky law prohibits pregnancy
discrimination in businesses with 8 or more employees. KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 344.030(1), (2), (6), (8), 344.040 (Michie 1994). Local ordinances in Louisville also
prohibit gender discrimination by employers. Louisville City Code § 98.17 (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); see also A Resolution to
Implement the State Statute Relative to Equal Employment Opportunities §§ 2(E),
3, Jefferson County, Ky. (1978) (enacted) (prohibiting employers with two or more
employees from discriminating on the basis of sex). Brown's claim against Mueller
for pregnancy discrimination was settled in her favor by the Kentucky Human
Relations Commission. See Conciliation Agreement, Brown v. Mueller Chiropractic,
No. C93-E2967 (Louisville & Ky. Human Relations Comm'n Mar. 17, 1994) (with-
drawing EEOC Complaint No. 241-93-0202) (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform). But cf. Troupe v. May Dep't Stores, 20 F.3d 734 (7th Cir.
1994) (holding that an employee who was fired on the day before her maternity leave
began was not discriminated against because of pregnancy).
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business needs and concerns" were the true culprits.8 2 In
effect, the referee balanced Brown's right not to be discrimi-
nated against because of her pregnancy against Mueller's busi-
ness needs and found the latter the weightier of the two. The
referee apparently was not persuaded that an employer might
not have the right to replace immediately a pregnant worker
who would be taking a maternity leave in the not-too-distant
future.
Second, the Commission applied an unconstitutional pre-
sumption when it ruled that Brown was on maternity leave
from her last day of work until the day she officially quit her
employment with Heuser. Brown testified that she was both
able and available to work during this period, and her testimo-
ny was not contradicted at the referee hearing.83 In order to
overcome this testimony, the Commission used a long-estab-
lished presumption and societal belief that pregnant women
are not able to work. Of course, presumptions of this nature
are invalid,84 but administrators of formal law often have
difficulty overcoming ingrained stereotypes.
The decision can also be criticized on ostensibly gender-
neutral grounds. The second referee forced Brown to prove a
negative, that she was not disqualified from receiving benefits.
Contrary to forcing opponents to disprove facts, burdens of
proof are usually assigned to the proponent of a particular
result "who generally seeks to change the present state of
affairs and who therefore naturally should be expected to bear
the risk of failure of proof or persuasion."85 The relevance of
the unsuitability of Brown's intervening employment was not
82. Referee Decision, Brown, AD No. 92-7696A, at 3.
83. Transcript of Evidence, Brown v. Heuser, AD No. 92-07696BA, at 25-26 (Div.
of Unemployment Ins., Dep't for Employment Servs. May 26, 1993) (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
84. See Turner v. Department of Employment Sec., 423 U.S. 44, 46 (1975) (hold-
ing that the presumption that a pregnant worker is unavailable for work is an invalid
conclusive presumption).
85. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 337 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984). Ken-
tucky case law provides that the burden of proving eligibility rests on the claimant
while the burden of proving disqualification falls on the employer. E.g., Brown Hotel
v. Edwards, 365 S.W.2d 299,301 (Ky. 1963). Although reported decisions in Kentucky
are silent on the situation presented in Brown's case-where the claimant is eligible,
accepts work elsewhere, and then quits-a good argument can be made that the
subsequent intervening termination, as a disqualifying event, should be proved by
the employer. The willingness of the hearing officer, the Commission, and the Court
of Appeals to force the claimant to prove a negative-that she was not disquali-
fied-notwithstanding the general rule to the contrary, certainly draws into question
their empathy for displaced workers.
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addressed by the Commission and was dismissed by the
courts. The accepted view in virtually every other state that
has considered the issue is that accepting and quitting unsuit-
able employment that pays substantially less than the claim-
ant's former employment will not disqualify the claimant from
receiving benefits to which she otherwise would have been
entitled." Although these unanimous holdings were presented
to the Kentucky Court of Appeals,8" the court made no men-
tion of them in its opinion.
88
The irony, of course, is that had Brown been awarded the
benefits to which she was entitled in the first place, she would
not have accepted employment that paid substantially less and
would not have been disqualified from compensation. The
referee's initial denial of benefits, likely based on stereotypical
views about pregnancy and the workplace, forced Brown into
a Catch-22 situation: Await proper enforcement without means
of support or accept marginal employment and forfeit benefits.
86. E.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 282-A:32(a)(1) (1994) (no disqualification where
an "unemployed individual, not under a disqualification, accepts employment which
would not have been deemed suitable work ... and terminates such employment
within a period of not more than 4 consecutive weeks of employment with or without
good cause"); Stuart v. Everett, 631 S.W.2d 25 (Ark. Ct. App. 1982); Herman v.
Florida Dep't of Commerce, 323 So. 2d 608 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Jacobsen v.
Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 420 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1981); Laya v. Cebar
Constr. Co., 300 N.W.2d 439 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); Valenty v. Medical Concepts Dev.,
503 N.W.2d 131 (Minn. 1993); Wojick v. Board of Review, 277. A.2d 529 (N.J. 1971);
Wallace v. Department of Employment Sec., 365 A.2d 517 (Vt. 1976); Mercer County
Bd. of Educ. v. Gatson, 412 S.E.2d 249 (W. Va. 1991). But see Taylor v. Iowa Dep't of
Job Serv., 362 N.W.2d 534 (Iowa 1985) (holding that voluntary termination of
unsuitable employment disqualifies claimant).
Reported decisions in Kentucky have yet to address whether quitting unsuitable
intervening employment will disqualify the claimant from receiving benefits. Kentucky
law does provide, however, that a claimant need not accept unsuitable work while
receiving benefits. Kentucky's disqualification provision requires that a disqualifying
separation be from the "most recent suitable" employment. KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 341.370(1)(c) (Michie 1994) (emphasis added). Moreover, Kentucky case law holds that
a voluntary separation from one's job because of a substantial salary reduction is
justifiable, e.g., International Spike v. Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, 609
S.W.2d 374 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980), and also holds that acceptance of an unsuitable change
in employment from the same employer does not waive a claim to benefits, e.g., Nichols
v. Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, 677 S.W.2d 317 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
87. Brief for Appellee/Cross-Appellant at 16-2 1, Brown v. Kentucky Unemploy-
ment Ins. Comm'n (Ky. Ct. App. June 23, 1995) (Nos. 94-CA-519-MR, 94-CA-605-MR)
(on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
88. Although Brown did not have to accept unsuitable employment, the Com-
mission insisted that quitting unsuitable employment disqualified Brown, and the
court of appeals agreed. See Brown, Nos. 94-CA-519-MR, 94-CA-605-MR, at 7.
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Because unemployment insurance laws are structured to
accommodate men,89 there is a strong likelihood that many
working mothers have experiences similar to Brown's. As
Professor Maranville explains
[Olur current legal system often affects women differently,
and less favorably, than men, and especially disadvantages
the majority of women whose lives are significantly affect-
ed by their roles as mothers .... [Tihe disfavored situation
of women often results because laws implicitly have been
structured to fit male life patterns-male norms that are
not stated as such, but are instead mistaken for the inevi-
table, natural state of being.90
The distinction between workers who "choose" to quit and
those who are "forced" out of the workplace, either by their
employer or their health, is inapposite in the context of preg-
nancy. The male free-will paradigm that distinguishes quits
from discharges does not work for pregnancy because a preg-
nant worker who becomes pregnant will interrupt her work
history for some period of time. Moreover, that interruption
usually proves consequential. 9' Because a true choice does not
exist for pregnant workers, free will should be abandoned as
not particularly useful to the calculus. The law instead should
look beyond worker motivation and focus on the consequences
of unemployment.




Extending unemployment coverage to pregnancy presents no
momentous legal obstacles. Two distinct doctrinal arguments
89. See Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: The Gender Paradox and the Limita-
tions of Discrimination Analysis in Restructuring the Workplace, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 79, 103 (1989).
90. Deborah Maranville, Feminist Theory and Legal Practice: A Case Study on
Unemployment Compensation Benefits and the Male Norm, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1081,
1085-86 (1992) (footnotes omitted).
91. See infra notes 128-43 and accompanying text.
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issues arise, the first one constitutional and the second one
statutory, but neither can be sustained. First, it might be
argued that extending unemployment insurance coverage to
pregnancy as opposed to all nonoccupational disabilities and
illnesses discriminates against male workers in violation of
the Equal Protection Clause. The Supreme Court has ruled,
however, that because men and women differ biologically in
terms of childbirth, different treatment is permissible for
pregnant workers. In Geduldig v. Aiello, 2 the Court upheld a
California disability program that exempted pregnancy from
coverage. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, explained:
[The program] does not exclude anyone from benefit eligi-
bility because of gender but merely removes one physical
condition-pregnancy-from the list of compensable dis-
abilities. While it is true that only women can become
pregnant, it does not follow that every legislative classifi-
cation concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification
.... Absent a showing that distinctions involving preg-
nancy are mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious
discrimination against the members of one sex or the
other, lawmakers are constitutionally free to include or
exclude pregnancy from the coverage of legislation such as
this on any reasonable basis, just as with respect to any
other physical condition.93
A similar result was reached in Michael M. v. Superior
Court,94 albeit with different reasoning. In Michael M., a
plurality of the Court sustained a California statutory rape
law that punished only males for having sexual intercourse
with females under eighteen years of age.95 Notwithstanding
the fact that the law facially discriminated against males,
Justice Rehnquist found the law permissible because females,
he argued, are naturally deterred from underage sexual rela-
tions by the fear of pregnancy, while males are not.9" Males
92. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
93. Id. at 497 n.20.
94. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
95. Id. at 476.
96. Id. at 473. Justice Stewart concurred on the basis of his decision in Geduldig:
"Young women and men are not similarly situated with respect to the problems and
risks associated with intercourse and pregnancy, and the statute is realistically
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therefore could be singled out for distinct treatment in an
effort to achieve equal deterrence.
Geduldig and Michael M. support the proposition that
pregnancy, as a constitutional matter, is an adequate basis for
treating men and women differently. Men and women are
biologically different with respect to pregnancy, thus justifying
distinct treatment, and even when men and women are consid-
ered similar in other areas, they may still be treated different-
ly to achieve an egalitarian result.9 7 Thus, in light of Geduldig
and Michael M., equal protection should not be an obstacle,
even when pregnancy is used to benefit rather than penalize
women.
98
A more nettlesome question is whether extending unem-
ployment insurance coverage to pregnant workers violates the
related to the legitimate state purpose of reducing those problems and risks." Id. at
479 (Stewart, J., concurring).
97. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 728 (1982) ("In
limited circumstances, a gender-based classification favoring one sex can be justified
if it intentionally and directly assists members of the sex that is disproportionately
burdened.").
98. If constitutional law speaks to the matter at all, it can be read to direct that
unemployment insurance not be denied because of pregnancy. A persuasive argument
may be made that the fundamental right to bear children, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972), coupled with the doctrine against unconstitutional eligibility
criteria, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), prohibits the government from
denying unemployment insurance to claimants who choose to procreate. See Judith
0. Brown et al., The Failure of Gender Equality: An Essay in Constitutional Disso-
nance, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 573, 635 (1987) (arguing that Sherbert v. Verner may be read
to require unemployment insurance for pregnant workers, but is not read this way
because of "deeply held assumptions and values, which are not sex-neutral"). For
example, in Sherbert, the Supreme Court ruled that a state could not deny unemploy-
ment benefits to a claimant who refused to work on her Sabbath. 374 U.S. at 410.
Notwithstanding that the state applied a religiously neutral rule-the good cause
requirement for voluntary separations-the Court found that the application of the
rule indirectly burdened the claimant's religion. Id. at 403. Applying the rule against
unconstitutional conditions, the Court held that the state could not condition
unemployment compensation on the forfeiture of a fundamental right. Id. at 410;
accord Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989) (holding the
same notwithstanding the absence of a formal religion); Hobbie v. Unemployment
Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Employ-
ment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981). But cf Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct.
1595 (1990) (holding that a religiously neutral law is not unconstitutional where the
asserted right is a right to ingest peyote). The similar argument is that unemploy-
ment insurance benefits may not be conditioned on a forfeiture of the fundamental
right to bear children. Although the analogy to Sherbert would seem strong, the
Supreme Court overlooked it in Wimberly v. Labor and Industrial Relations Commis-
sion, 479 U.S. 511 (1987), and rejected it in the context of the fundamental right to
choose an abortion in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). Given Wimberly and
Harris, the likelihood of success for this argument is small.
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statutory mandates of the FUTA.99 Two arguments arise that
might limit state legislation that aids pregnant workers. First,
§ 3304(a)(12) might be read to require strict neutrality in
terms of gender and pregnancy. Second, a broad interpretation
of § 3304(a)(4) could prohibit states from compensating work-
ers who are not continuously available for employment, the
result of which would be a federally mandated forfeiture of
benefits during at least part of a claimant's pregnancy.
Yet neither argument is convincing. Although the Supreme
Court has left open the question whether § 3304(a)(12) allows
special treatment for pregnancy, 100 the literal language of
§ 3304(a)(12) indicates that Congress did not intend to fore-
close assistance to benign pregnant workers. The provision
states that "no person shall be denied [unemployment] com-
pensation ... solely on the basis of pregnancy or termination
of pregnancy."' The proscription of § 3304(a)(12), therefore,
prohibits disadvantageous treatment for pregnancy, but says
nothing about beneficial treatment. 10 2 Requiring strict neu-
trality from a fair reading of § 3304(a)(12) would require
reading the words "or allowed" into the statute immediately
following the word "denied," a clearly contrived result.
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA),10 3 which amended
Title VII, uses more gender-neutral language than that found
in the FUTA and yet has been interpreted to allow special
treatment for pregnancy. In California Federal Savings &
Loan v. Guerra, the Supreme Court found that the PDA was
not intended to prevent states from requiring that employers
provide pregnant workers unpaid leave and reinstatement
following pregnancy.'0 4 The relevant language in the PDA
provides that "women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all
99. 26 U.S.C. §§ 3304-3311 (1994).
100. See Wimberly, 479 U.S. at 521-22 (holding that § 3304(a)(12) does not man-
date preferential treatment for pregnancy but not reaching whether state preferences
are permitted).
101. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(12).
102. See Christine N. O'Brien & Gerald A. Madek, Pregnancy Discrimination and
Maternity Leave Laws, 93 DICK. L. REV. 311, 325 (1989). "[In post-Guerra America,
the sexes need not be treated equally in terms of disability, because women are more
regularly disadvantaged by pregnancy disability without job protection than are men
by any sex specific disability." Id.
103. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994).
104. See 479 U.S. 272, 287-88 (1987).
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employment-related purposes ... as other persons not so
affected but similar in their ability or inability to work."10 5 If
"shall be treated the same" allows benign treatment for pregnan-
cy,1" 6 then "shall [not] be denied compensation"0 7 should also
permit accommodating treatment.
Whether § 3304(a)(4) of the FUTA requires that claimants
remain "available" to work is a more amorphous question.
Section 3304 says nothing about availability. Yet an argument
may be fashioned from the wording and intent of § 3304 to
support availability as a federal mandate. The § 3304(a)(1) re-
quirement that unemployment compensation be paid through
"unemployment offices,"0 8 for example, has been interpreted to
mean that only those actively seeking and able to work are
entitled to benefits.0 9 Additionally, the limited exemption for
payments made "to individuals with respect to their disability""0
might be interpreted to imply that states violate the FUTA
when they make payments to disabled, or unable and hence
unavailable, claimants outside the terms of the exemption.
Because the FUTA's express terms do not require that a
claimant remain available, and because the federal courts have
not been forced to resolve the issue, the matter remains unset-
tled."1 Assuming that federal law requires availability, the
question then becomes what that mandate means. Specifically,
would a federal availability requirement preclude states from
providing benefits to pregnant claimants pre-partum? In light
of the broad contours of the FUTA, its insistence on uniformity
only where necessary,"' and a historical experience that
105. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
106. See Guerra, 479 U.S. at 287.
107. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(12) (1994).
108. Id. § 3304(a)(1).
109. See Gladys Harrison, Eligibility and Disqualification for Benefits, 55 YALE
L.J. 117, 119 (1945) ("Tihe worker to be eligible must be 'available for work.' The
federal sanction behind such provisions is the requirement that public employment
offices be utilized in the claims-payment process.") (footnote omitted).
110. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(4)(A) ([An amount equal to the amount of employee
payments into the unemployment fund of a state may be used in the payment of cash
benefits to individuals with respect to their disability, exclusive of expenses of
administration .... ').
111. All states require, however, that claimants remain available. See supra
note 32.
112. In Ohio Board of Employment Services v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471 (1977), the
Court noted: "The plan for unemployment compensation ... contemplates that the
States shall have broad freedom to set up the type of unemployment compensation
they wish .... All matters in which uniformity is not absolutely essential should be
left to the States." Id. at 483.
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affords states latitude in fashioning their unemployment
insurance laws, the answer should be no. Regardless of a
federal mandate to compensate only "available" claimants,
states should be legally competent to define "availability" so
as not to exclude pre-partum compensation."
3
If uncertainty clouds the propriety of state action, rather
than deny benefits to otherwise worthy pregnant claimants, the
better course is to amend the FUTA to make it clear that pre-
partum" unemployment insurance is permissible. Better yet,
Congress should pass legislation requiring unemployment
insurance for pregnancy-based separations from employment.
B. Normative Arguments for Extending Benefits
The primary normative arguments in favor of unemployment
insurance for pregnancy-based separations from employment
are threefold: insurance would (1) foster gender equality in the
workplace by accommodating biological and sociological differ-
ences between men and women; (2) ameliorate the effect that
pregnancy has on poverty; and (3) safeguard pregnant workers
who fall into anomalous gaps in current laws, either because
the law offers no protection or because it is simply under-
enforced.
1. Fostering Gender Equality-Congress has summarized
the problems of working parents, especially women, in the
Family and Medical Leave Act:1 4
Hodory involved a worker furloughed from his employment because of a strike at
another U.S. Steel plant. Id. at 473. The worker had been denied unemployment
insurance benefits because, according to the state, his unemployment was caused by
a labor strike. He sued in federal court and argued that the state was required by the
FUTA to compensate him. Id. at 475. In particular, he argued that because he was
involuntarily unemployed he was entitled to benefits as a matter of federal law. Id.
at 482. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, finding that the state could choose
to insure the worker but also might choose not to. See id. at 484. The suggestions
found in congressional reports that only "involuntarily unemployed" workers be
compensated were only "an expression of caution that funds should not be dispensed
too freely, and is not a direction that funds must be dispensed." Id.
113. For example, whether a pregnant worker is "available" might be assessed by
focusing on her intent to return to work after childbirth. See infra note 182-86 and
accompanying text. If so, a worker's pregnancy and temporary absence from the work
force need not mean that she is unavailable.
114. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994).
FALL 1995-WINTER 1996]
70 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 29:1&2
[Tihe number of single-parent households and two-parent
households in which the single parent or both parents work
is increasing significantly;
1 5
[Tihe lack of employment policies to accommodate working
parents can force individuals to choose between job security
and parenting;..6 [and]
[Due to the nature of the roles of men and women in our
society, the primary responsibility for family caretaking
often falls on women, and such responsibility affects the
working lives of women more than it affects the working
lives of men .... 117
Various statistics confirm these findings. In 1970, women
comprised only 38% of the labor force." 8 By 1993, the number
had grown to 46%." 9 The percentage of women participating
in the labor force also continues to grow: In 1970, only 43% of
America's women were working; in 1993 that rate had climbed
to 58%.120 The participation rate of married mothers, mean-
while, increased to 68% in 1992.121
Professor Maureen E. Lally-Green reports that the number
of single-parent households has increased because of the high
rate of divorce and out-of-wedlock births.122 In 1987, 19% of
mothers aged eighteen to forty-four were single. 23 Moreover,
the median annual income for families was $40,422 when the
wife was in the labor force and $26,652 when she was not.
124
Based on this data, Professor Lally-Green concludes that
"parents in most families work, and most do so because they
must."
125
115. Id. § 2601(a)(1).
116. Id. § 2601(a)(3).
117. Id. § 2601(a)(5).




121. WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, 1993 HANDBOOK ON WOMEN WORK-
ERS: TRENDS AND ISSUES 10 (1994) [hereinafter WOMEN WORKERS].
122. Maureen E. Lally-Green, The Implications of Inadequate Maternity Leave
Policies Under Title VII, 16 VT. L. REV. 223, 227 (1991).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. (emphasis added); see also Women's Income No Luxury, Poll Finds, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, May 11, 1995, at 3A (reporting a poll indicating that "[m]ore than
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That women, including women who are mothers, work-
and must work-seems clear. Also clear are the adverse
effects that pregnancy and employers' attitudes have on
women in the workplace. Everyone is familiar with the wage
gap that divides men and women in the workplace.'26 What is
not fully understood is the cause of this phenomenon. Issa-
charoff and Rosenblum report that the chronic wage gap be-
tween men and women is in large part attributable to greater
male seniority. 2 7 Wage differentials can be explained largely
by women's greater tendency, both real'28 and imagined,'29 to
interrupt their careers. "[Tihe greater likelihood of women
leaving the work force is highly correlated with an expected
lower career-wage profile." 3 ' The increased hazard rate for
women, in turn, is very likely explained by the "birth-effect."
"Having children makes it more likely that women will leave
the work force altogether or switch to part-time employ-
ment."'3 ' Uninsured women are then left with unequal means
to compete with their male counterparts. Women spend more
time searching for employment'32 and lose continuous work
force participation.'33 Lower wages and less seniority result.
Because the private market has not adjusted to this prob-
lem, "'34 laws must be designed to cushion the blow that unem-
ployment forces on pregnant workers. Roughly half of those
employed by small businesses, "' who disproportionately tend
half the employed women surveyed-including single and married women-said they
provided at least half of their household's income .... Even among married women,
48 percent said they provided half or more of the family income").
126. See Issacharoff & Rosenblum, supra note 9, at 2160.
127. Id.
128. Among more experienced workers, women are "significantly more likely
than men to quit not only a particular job, but to leave the work force altogether."
Id. at 2163.
129. Among entry-level workers, "the expected tenure of a woman at her first
full-time job was virtually identical to that of a man." Id.
130. Id. at 2164.
131. Id. at 2165 (footnote omitted).
132. See O'Brien & Madek, supra note 102, at 320 ("The woman who is not guar-
anteed a return to her old job must engage in a job search and her family can suffer
real economic hardship, if the woman worker has no unemployment compensation.")
(internal quotation omitted).
133. Issacharoff & Rosenblum, supra note 9, at 2166.
134. See generally Nancy E. Dowd, Maternity Leave: Taking Sex Differences into
Account, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 699, 706-15 (1986) (identifying the failures of privately
negotiated maternity leave).
135. In small establishments, defined as those employing fewer than 100 employ-
ees, only 53% of employees are provided any sick leave at all. U.S. BUREAU OF THE
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to be women,136 and one-third of those employed in medium
and large businesses 137 are not entitled to any paid disability
or maternity leave whatsoever.1 3 1 Moreover, privately nego-
tiated disability policies often suffer several drawbacks, in-
cluding durational eligibility requirements, no coverage for
part-time employees, and inadequate benefits.
1 39
Although the number of businesses offering unpaid leave is
increasing 4 ° and probably will increase with the adoption of
the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA),'' unpaid leave
does not address the problems of lower-echelon employees who
cannot financially afford unemployment.'42 Professor Maria
O'Brien Hylton has observed that "[iun the case of parental
leaves there is every reason to believe that the increased costs
will be borne primarily by low-skill female employees-those
least likely to be able to take advantage of the legislation."43
Hence, notwithstanding the FMLA's good intentions, it is not
a panacea for the poor.
Social equity demands that pregnancy-based interruptions of
employment be financially accommodated. 144 Although any
CENSUS, supra note 118, at 434. In medium and large businesses, those employing
100 or more employees, the figure rises to 67%. Id.
136. O'Brien & Madek, supra note 102, at 328.
137. See supra note 135.
138. Under the terms of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, private disability
plans covering temporary disabilities must also include maternity leave. See Dowd,
supra note 134, at 708-09. However, "[t]he best estimates of the availability of
maternity leave indicate that fully one-quarter of all employers do not provide any
maternity leave." Id. at 710.
139. Id. at 711-12.
140. In 1991-1992, the rate for unpaid maternity leave was 37% for large and
medium-sized companies and 18% for small companies, compared to only 2% paid
maternity leave for small, medium, and large businesses. U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, supra note 118, at 434.
141. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994)), requires that private employers employ-
ing 50 or more employees must provide employees who have worked for 12 continuous
months 12 weeks unpaid leave during and immediately after pregnancy. 29 U.S.C.
§§ 2611(4)(A)(1), 2612(a)(1)(A).
142. See Brown et al., supra note 98, at 581 ("Since women are often in low
paying, non-unionized jobs, they are likely to receive little help from such a policy.")
(footnote omitted).
143. Maria 0. Hylton, "Parental" Leaves and Poor Women: Paying the Price for
Time Off, 52 U. PiTT. L. REV. 475, 518 (1991).
144. Issacharoff and Rosenblum explain:
If the objective of a regulatory intervention into the employment market is to
allow women the opportunity for career-wage profiles comparable to those of
men, .. . the predictable mid-career interruptions caused by pregnancy must be
accommodated under a regulatory scheme aimed at protecting the ability of
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number of mechanisms might be created to protect continuing
and equal participation of women in the work force, Issacharoff
and Rosenblum argue persuasively that "an insurance model for
pregnancy leave based on the unemployment insurance system"
provides the most realistic alternative. 4 5 Because the unem-
ployment insurance system is extant and requires only minimal
modification, and because it affords the advantage of socializing
monetary costs, this Article joins that endorsement.
2. Pregnancy and Poverty-A startling phenomenon has
been the "feminization of poverty" during the last two de-
cades.'46 "The feminization of poverty is characterized as such
because of the increase in the number of families consisting of
a single mother and her children with no husband present."47
The Department of Labor reports that although women make
up 51.3% of the population, they make up 57.7% of the popula-
tion below the poverty line. 148 Even more disturbing is the fact
that 99% of the increase in families in poverty between 1970
and 1990 was an increase in poor families headed by fe-
males. 149 While married-couple families had a poverty rate of
5.7% in 1990, the poverty rate for families with a female head
of household was 33.4%."50 Nearly 53% of all poor families
were headed by a female with husband absent.' 5 '
Welfare no longer appears to be a politically viable concept.
Alternatives to welfare include employment and unemploy-
ment insurance. Because society has yet to find the solution to
unemployment-that is, the market cannot employ every-
one-some form of unemployment insurance is necessary to
avoid casting a larger percentage of the American population
into poverty. I do not intend to reinvent the unemployment
insurance wheel.'52 Suffice it to say that, given the significant
women to continue their career work force participation through the predictable
periods of fertility.
Issacharoff & Rosenblum, supra note 9, at 2171.
145. Id. at 2215.
146. Brown et al., supra note 98, at 585-86.
147. WOMEN WORKERS, supra note 121, at 37.
148. Id. "There are more than a third ... as many poor women as there are poor
men." Id.
149. Id. at 38.
150. Id. at 39.
151. Id.
152. For an excellent discussion of the policies behind unemployment insurance,
see Kenneth M. Casebeer, Unemployment Insurance: American Social Wage, Labor
Organization and Legal Ideology, 35 B.C. L. REV. 259 (1994).
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correlation between single mothers and poverty, unemploy-
ment insurance might wisely and frugally be directed toward
pregnant workers. 5 ' The elimination of even a small degree of
poverty should be worth the cost.
154
3. Deconstructing Distinctions-States that provide un-
employment benefits to pregnant claimants uniformly require
that the separation from employment be medically necessary
and that the pregnant claimant remain available to work.'55
The net effect is unpaid maternity leave, with unemployment
benefits available only post-partum. This practice appears to
be the conventional wisdom. Even Issacharoff and Rosenblum
propose a post-partum model, with unemployment benefits
being paid "twelve weeks post-partum, ... with pre-partumY)156
complications treated under normal disability programs. The
problem with Issacharoffs and Rosenblum's proposal is that
only a handful of states compensate disabled'57 or pregnant
workers. 5 ' In the vast majority of states, a worker who takes
a medically necessary leave will not receive state-sponsored
disability payments. Private arrangements may of course be
made for paid disability leave, which cannot discriminate
against pregnancy,'59 but a large number of employees have
153. Interestingly, the Frazier-Lundeen Bill, also known as the Workers' Bill,
which was the forerunner to the FUTA, provided protection for maternity leave. See
H.R. 2827, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1935).
154. Cf Hylton, supra note 143, at 518 ("[T]here can be little question but that
the costs of unemployment or underemployment are not borne exclusively by those
most directly affected .... [Tihe nexus between high rates of unemployment and
violent crime is well established and obviously affects us all.").
155. See supra notes 26-35 and accompanying text.
156. Issacharoff& Rosenblum, supra note 9, at 2217. They argue for more compen-
sation, however, so that unemployment benefits equal "two-thirds of average taxable
earnings for the past twenty-six weeks of employment." Id; see also Esterle, supra note
13, at 713 ("In modern times, the pregnant woman needs the assistance of unemploy-
ment benefits once she is ready to return to work.").
157. By "disabled," I am referring to nonoccupational illnesses and injuries.
Occupational illnesses and injuries may support awards of unemployment benefits
because of the connection with employment. See supra note 26. Note, however, that
the claimant must remain available for work. For this reason, occupational illnesses
and injuries are normally compensated under relevant workers' compensation laws.
Supra note 26.
158. See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
159. See Dowd, supra note 89, at 121 ("[E]mployers are not required to provide
[disability leave], nor are they required to provide benefits sufficient to cover all
pregnancy-related disability. Rather, courts have read the PDA to require only the
same disability coverage (or lack thereof) as that provided to male employees.")
(footnotes omitted). The Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) provides that "women
affected by pregnancy ... shall be treated the same for all employment-related
purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs." 42 U.S.C.
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failed to negotiate protection. 160 Moreover, private coverage as-
sumes that the worker remains employed; 16 as demonstrated
in Jenny Brown's case, 162 employers are not adverse to dis-
charging pregnant employees.
163
If unemployment insurance is to achieve the dual objectives
of fostering gender equality and obviating the feminization of
poverty, coverage must be afforded pre-partum as well as post-
partum: The anomaly of providing coverage post-partum, but
not pre-partum, serves no legitimate purpose. Instead, a preg-
nant claimant forced from the labor market because of medical
necessity should qualify for unemployment benefits pre-partum
during her period of unavailability as well as post-partum.
Benefits should continue after childbirth either until the
claimant is able to locate suitable work or until the twenty-six
week eligibility window closes. Of course, this does not address
§ 2000e(k) (1994); see also Cynthia L. Remmers, Pregnancy Discrimination and Paren-
tal Leave, 11 INDUS. REL. L.J. 377, 397 (1989) (reporting that "[s]ome fifteen states
and the District of Columbia have enacted legislation that classifies pregnancy as a
disability. Similar to the PDA, these state laws and regulations require that pregnant
employees should be treated the same as other employees with temporary disabilities
and accordingly, that maternity leaves be treated as sick leave").
160. Half of those employees working for small businesses, and one-third of those
working for medium and large employers, are not entitled to paid disability leave. See
supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
161. At least outside the coverage of the FMLA, "disability leave usually does not
guarantee job security. Thus, under existing policies and legislation, childbirth often
results in loss of employment or of employment status." Dowd, supra note 89, at 122.
162. See supra Part II.
163. This is true notwithstanding Title VII. Because the restrictions of the PDA
are limited to employers with 15 or more employees, small businesses are not covered.
Moreover, today's federal courts are not prone to give the PDA a broad, protective
reading. In Troupe v. May Department Stores, 20 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1994), a pregnant
worker was fired the day before she was to begin a paid maternity leave, allegedly
because of repeated tardiness, but rather, according to Troupe, because her employer
"did not expect her to return to work after her maternity leave was up." Id. at 737.
Accepting as true Troupe's testimony that her employer fired her because the company
did not expect her back after her maternity leave, Judge Posner concluded that no
prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination had been established:
We must imagine a hypothetical [man about to take extended leave for a kidney
transplant]. If [the employer] would have fired our hypothetical [man], this
implies that it fired Ms. Troupe not because she was pregnant but because she
cost the company more than she was worth to it.
Id. at 738. Troupe's failure to disprove this hypothetical with evidence that an
employee with leave similar in length to hers had not been fired "doomed her case."
Id. at 739.
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pregnant workers who leave the workplace before their mater-
nity leave becomes necessary. I hope to show below, however,
that they should be insured.
C. Normative Counter-Arguments
1. Penalizing Faultless Employers-One counter-argument
to my proposal is that it penalizes faultless employers. As the
argument goes, a worker's pregnancy is not the fault of her
employer and the employer should not be penalized by being
held accountable-via a higher experience rating-for the
worker's unemployment. The rejoinder to this argument is
threefold. First, unemployment insurance was not originally
envisioned as a fault-based system, nor is it a function of
employer-based fault today in a majority of states.'64 In 1938,
only two states focused on the employer's fault by requiring
that good cause for quitting be "attributable to" the employ-
er,165 and most states still do not require employer-based
fault. 166 Consequently, the argument that compensating preg-
nant claimants improperly holds employers strictly liable
proves too much. The fact is that employers often are held
liable for unemployment benefits even though they are not at
fault.
6 7
Second, the argument for fault does not respond to the
question of when unemployment compensation should be paid:
pre- or post-partum. Because my suggestion to compensate pre-
partum as well as post-partum claimants would only shift
benefits forward, and not increase the total amount paid, those
164. See Casebeer, supra note 152, at 336-37.
165. Id. at 330.
166. For example, a large number of states compensate, albeit post-partum,
pregnant claimants who quit work because of medical necessity even though neither
the pregnancy nor the medical necessity is the employer's fault. See supra notes 27-36
and accompanying text.
167. Of course, this does not address the broader question of whether unemploy-
ment insurance should be based solely on the employer's fault. My point is that the
system currently is not truly fault based in most states; thus, singling out pregnancy
for fault-based treatment makes no sense. Cf. Martin H. Malin, Unemployment
Compensation in a Time of Increasing Work-Family Conflicts, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REF.
131, 152 (1996) ("Courts are fond of saying that the disqualification standards ensure
that UI benefits are paid only to workers who are unemployed through no fault of
their own. The concept of fault, however, does not describe the disqualification
standards with sufficient precision to be helpful.") (footnote omitted).
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states which already allow benefits post-partum should have
little or no complaint. I recognize that there is some risk of
increased benefits if pre-partum unemployment is covered in
addition to post-partum unemployment. However, given that
women and mothers work today because they must, 168 the fear
that women will become pregnant and quit work to receive
unemployment insurance is overstated. Hence, the likelihood
that the total amount of pregnancy-related benefits paid would
increase because pre-partum separations are included is also
overstated. Benefits now expire after twenty-six weeks, 169 and
experience teaches that pregnancy on average causes unem-
ployment for only half of that time.' ° Granted, those states
which do not compensate pregnancy-related separations would
incur a greater expense, but a financial complaint is different
from one based on the moral imperative of fault.
Third, pregnancy-related unemployment insurance need not
and should not be experience rated; fault would then prove to
be irrelevant. The Advisory Council on Unemployment Com-
pensation has observed that "states have a significant amount
of freedom in deciding what percentage of their benefit costs
will be experience-rated and what percentage will be social-
ized."17' Experience rating is not necessary for pregnancy-
related unemployment claims because employers equally risk
that a worker will become pregnant and separate from the
workplace. Pregnancy falls beyond the employer's control and,
as Issacharoff and Rosenblum have observed, "[Tihere is no
evidence that women are likely to have children specifically to
collect pregnancy leave benefits .... The cost of com-
pensating pregnant claimants should follow the risk, which is
the same for all employers. The cost should therefore be borne
equally. 173 Indeed, experience rating in the pregnancy context
168. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
169. See ACUC REPORT, supra note 6, at 33. Massachusetts and Washington allow
benefits for 30 weeks. Id. at 39 n.5.
170. See infra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
171. ACUC REPORT, supra note 6, at 85. Socialized unemployment insurance
currently includes: "(1) payments to workers who quit their last job, (2) dependents'
benefits, (3) payments to workers who are enrolled in approved training, (4) erroneous
benefit payments that are not recovered, and (5) the state share of the Extended
Benefits program." Id. at 78.
172. Issacharoff & Rosenblum, supra note 9, at 2216.
173. The cost, of course, would increase, but it would be borne equally. That
compensating pregnancy-related separations will cost more is certainly a valid con-
cern. But see infra notes 192-96 and accompanying text (estimating low costs of
expanded coverage).
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might create a disincentive to hiring women. 174 It should
therefore be avoided.
A related claim is that pregnancy insurance will increase the
"moral hazard" of beneficiaries triggering benefits on purpose.
Knowing that she will receive unemployment compensation
after becoming pregnant, the argument goes, a woman is
encouraged to become pregnant in order to quit her job.
175
Again, Issacharoff and Rosenblum have found no evidence
supporting the proposition that women will get pregnant in
order to quit their jobs and collect unemployment insurance.
76
Indeed, the notion is counterintuitive when stated in gender-
neutral terms. Women are no more likely to become pregnant
to collect unemployment insurance than are men intentionally
to risk disability for the same reason.
One might also argue that women will be encouraged to
abuse the unemployment insurance system by taking and quit-
ting jobs to subsidize existing pregnancies. For instance, "a
nonworking woman in the early stages of pregnancy, or in-
tending to become pregnant, may use a pregnancy insurance
system as a form of welfare-type subsidy simply by finding
employment." 7 To combat this possibility, Issacharoff and
Rosenblum urge the adoption of the Canadian "magic ten" rule,
which requires that the claimant work for her employer for ten
weeks prior to conception to qualify for benefits. 178 Pre-employ-
ment pregnancy, or pregnancy within ten weeks of the job's
commencement, would disqualify the claimant.
What then of the pregnant worker who is fired or forced to
quit because of her pregnancy and who cannot demonstrate
that her separation is medically necessary? As in the case of
Jenny Brown, 79 that unemployment compensation should be
paid does not mean that it will. Employers can bend the facts
of any given case to avoid liability, and pregnancy itself can be
used as probative evidence that the claimant left work volun-
tarily. In the absence of medical necessity, a voluntary separa-
tion would disqualify the claimant from receiving benefits.
174. See infra notes 199-203 and accompanying text.
175. Cf Malin, supra note 167, at 155 (discussing moral hazard problems).
176. Issacharoff & Rosenblum, supra note 9, at 2216.
177. Id. at 2217-18.
178. Id. at 2218.
179. See supra Part II.
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Professor Martin Malin has observed that the current un-
employment laws generate anomalous results in the context of
familial obligations. Malin notes, for example, that an employ-
ee who quits because of family responsibilities which the
employer refuses to accommodate is disqualified from receiving
benefits, while the same employee who is fired for tending to
these responsibilities is not.8 ° Peculiar conclusions are, of
course, not the hallmark of a stable legal system and should
be avoided whenever possible. Disqualifying a pregnant claim-
ant who allegedly has quit without a medically verifiable
reason will only encourage anomaly. The current net of
disqualification is already cast wide enough to achieve dis-
concerting conclusions. Given current attitudes about preg-
nancy and mothers' "proper" place in the labor market, easily
manipulable distinctions should be eliminated wherever
possible. One such distinction exists between a claimant fired
and one voluntarily separated from employment because of
pregnancy. Although perhaps workable in theory, the
distinction should be dismissed as too difficult to prove and too
trivial to be important. Rather, unemployment insurance
coverage should be provided to all pregnant workers who leave
the labor force, whether because of discharge, medical
necessity, or personal preference.81
Admittedly, this proposal carries with it problems that one
would prefer to leave behind. For instance, a malingerer might
take advantage of the system by quitting work upon discovery
of her pregnancy. Such a hypothetical, though not outside the
realm of possibility, runs counter to experience. Women and
mothers work because they must.8 2 Few women will take solace
in the fact that they can become pregnant, quit their job,
temporarily receive a small percentage of their pay, 8 3 and forfeit
180. Malin, supra note 167, at 174.
181. This assumes, of course, that the pregnant claimant is otherwise qualified
under the relevant unemployment insurance provisions. I am not alone in making this
recommendation. Although they do not elaborate the details of their proposal, Profes-
sors O'Brien and Madek have urged "a new national priority for parental leave with
some wage replacement." O'Brien & Madek, supra note 102, at 311. They argue that
"[siociety gains by providing unemployment compensation benefits for eligible women
who are willing to work but who are forced to leave their jobs because of pregnancy."
Id. at 319.
182. See supra notes 114-25 and accompanying text.
183. Benefits are normally limited to 50% of a worker's average gross wage, with
the amount capping at between $116 and $335 per week. ACUC REPORT, supra note
6, at 34.
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whatever benefits package they might have through their
employer. The experience in California, 184 for example, teaches
that time away from work because of medically necessary
maternity leave is shorter than time away for all other disabili-
ties. 185 Because women do not use pregnancy to avoid work any
more than men use illness or injury, one would not expect
women inordinately to abuse the unemployment insurance
system.
Moreover, the twenty-six week window for benefits should
discourage a hasty separation from employment. The knowledge
that unemployment benefits will expire before or shortly after
childbirth if the claimant quits early, coupled with the reality
that new work is difficult to find--especially late in the pregnan-
cy-should encourage pregnant claimants to continue working
as long as possible. Pregnant workers quitting their jobs simply
to receive unemployment benefits will not be common.
Motivational distinctions in the context of pregnancy-related
separations from employment are exaggerated and arbitrary. A
pregnant woman who is fired is just as much out of work as one
who quits. Both face an uncertain future in the labor force and
both risk falling into poverty. Some, like Jenny Brown, 8 6 will
be denied benefits notwithstanding wrongful discharge. To avoid
anomalous results and guard against wrongful denials, unem-
ployment benefits should be extended across the board in cases
of pregnancy-based separations.
2. Costs in Dollars-An immediate concern over extending
unemployment benefits to pregnancy is financial: How much
will it cost? Monetary costs, of course, will differ between
states that currently award benefits to pregnant claimants
post-partum and those that do not insure pregnancy at all. In-
creased costs for the former should prove marginal because in
most instances only the timing of the benefits will change;
because of the twenty-six week cap, paying benefits earlier
should not increase the total payout. Still, because I propose to
184. California compensates pregnancy as a disability. See supra notes 31, 40 and
accompanying text.
185. The average disability leave based on pregnancy in California in 1994 was
10.84 weeks. Memorandum from Jeanne Hughes, California Disability Insurance
Branch, Health and Welfare Agency, to Professor Mark R. Brown 5 (Feb. 22, 1995)
(on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). During that same
period, the average for all disabilities, including pregnancy compensated by the state
plan, was 12.88 weeks. Id. at 4.
186. See supra Part II.
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insure all pregnancy-related separations, as opposed to only
medically necessary separations, a raw dollar increase must be
expected. The question is how much.
Though no exact figure is available, an outside limit may be
estimated. Since 1979, California has treated pregnancy as a
disability under its state-sponsored Disability Insurance Pro-
gram. 18v Since 1982, pregnancy claims under the Disability
Insurance Program18 have accounted for between 19% to 22%
of total claims paid.189 During this same period, the actual cost
of pregnancy claims ranged from 16% to 20% of the total
amount paid. 19 In 1994, for example, pregnancy claims made
up 22.3% of the claims filed and accounted for 17.5% of the
benefits actually paid out.19' Put another way, the inclusion of
pregnancy increased the number of claims by 29% and the
amount of benefits by 21%.
A more careful analysis of this data, however, indicates that
the actual increase should be much smaller. The pool of unem-
ployment claims extends well beyond disability. That pregnancy
claims constitute one in five disability claims does not neces-
sarily mean that pregnancy claims will constitute one in five
unemployment claims. Unemployment claims in California last
year were made at approximately five times the rate of
disability claims and at almost twenty-four times the rate of
pregnancy-related disability claims. 192 Cast as a percentage of
unemployment, medically necessary maternity leaves were only
4% the number of the unemployment insurance claims and cost
less than 10% of the amount paid.' 93
187. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §§ 2625-2628 (West 1986 & Supp. 1996).
188. Pregnancy leave must be medically necessary to be compensable under this
program. See id. § 2626(a), (b).
189. See Memorandum from Jeanne Hughes to Professor Mark R. Brown, supra
note 185, at 2.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 3.
192. In 1994, claimants in California filed 3,636,511 initial claims for unemploy-
ment insurance. CALIFORNIA EMPLOYMENT DEV. DEP'T, ETA-5159/513, CLAIM AND
PAYMENT ACTIVITIES/UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE ACTIVITIES REPORTS (Mar. 1995).
That same year, disability claims totaled 689,365, while pregnancy-related disability
claims totaled 153,659. Memorandum from Jeanne Hughes to Professor Mark R.
Brown, supra note 185, at 3.
193. See supra note 192. In 1994, the total amount paid for unemployment insur-
ance was $3,406,542,370. CALIFORNIA EMPLOYMENT DEV. DEP'T, supra note 192, at
1. The same year, California paid a total of $329,045,913 for pregnancy-related
disability claims. Memorandum from Jeanne Hughes to Professor Mark R. Brown,
supra note 185, at 3.
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Granted, California insures only medically necessary, as
opposed to all, maternity leaves, and the correlation between its
disability and unemployment schemes is not perfect. Because
disability benefits in California are generous,'94 however, the
percentage of the total amount paid likely errs on the high side.
That California compensates only medically necessary leaves,
moreover, should not greatly affect the rate of pregnancy-based
separations; a pregnant claimant will at some time find it
medically necessary to take a leave of absence. The average
length of separation might be longer in a system that does not
require medical necessity, which means increased costs. But the
increase is easily overstated. Because claimants are not likely
to take a leave of absence at a substantially reduced salary
unless it is truly necessary,'95 the average length of leave
should not differ markedly from the length of separation due to
medical necessity.'96
The California model suggests that the number of unem-
ployment claims arising out of pregnancy should increase
claims by roughly 4%."9 The financial cost of including preg-
nancy, though more speculative, should not be appreciably
greater. Instead, the California experience indicates that insur-
ing pregnancy is a lot less expensive than one might think. 9 '
3. Stereotyping and Encouraging Discrimination-A larger
problem than financial costs is the potential for stereotyping
and encouraging discrimination against women. A sticking
point in the passage of the Family and Medical Leave Act was
the fear that employers would view women as the primary
beneficiaries of unpaid leave and thereby engage in discrim-
194. Disability benefits in California are unlimited in duration, although on
average they did not exceed 13 weeks in 1994. See Memorandum from Jeanne Hughes
to Professor Mark R. Brown, supra note 185, at 4. Weekly benefit amounts are set at
55% of the claimant's average weekly salary up to a maximum of $336 per week. CAL.
UNEMP. INS. CODE § 2655 (West Supp. 1996).
195. See supra notes 182-85 and accompanying text.
196. A practical observation reinforces this point. Because of the potential for tort
liability, physicians are more likely to err on the side of stating that pregnancy
renders the claimant unable to work. Thus, obtaining a medical opinion that one
should cease working, which is normally all that is required, should not be too diffi-
cult. The medical necessity requirement, then, does not prove very different from my
proposal.
197. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
198. I recognize that further study of the financial costs is necessary. However,
the California example is useful because it suggests that the cost might be much less
than expected.
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inatory hiring practices.199 The same argument may be made
with regard to pregnancy-related unemployment benefits.
Even if the employer is not penalized by a higher experience
rating,200 it might avoid female employees because of perceived
"dislocation costs," 20 1 that is, the cost of replacing an employee
who takes a leave of absence.
To avoid this incentive, Issacharoff and Rosenblum propose
that "between fifteen and forty percent of the pregnancy bene-
fits be paid to the firm to underwrite the costs of continuing
benefits and securing temporary replacements." 20 2 Notwith-
standing Issacharoffs and Rosenblum's misgivings, as well as
a large amount of scholarship protesting special treatment for
pregnant workers,20 3 the fear of additional discrimination is
exaggerated. Pregnancy insurance is not likely to inflate
existing discriminatory practices by any appreciable margin,
because-unlike mandatory private insurance-employers will
bear the same tax regardless of whether or not they hire
women. 24 Moreover, the rate of dislocation should not increase
because of the availability of pregnancy benefits.20 5
Time away from work might increase because of pregnancy
insurance, which could in turn cause a reciprocal increase in
dislocation costs.20 6 But even if women risk discrimination
because of increased dislocation costs, the lack of realistic
alternatives suggests that pregnancy insurance is worth the
risk. Doing nothing, expanding unpaid leave,20 7 or providing
greater unemployment insurance coverage on a gender-neutral
199. Cf Remmers, supra note 159, at 409 ([E]mployers will tend to view women
as the beneficiaries of a parental leave policy. This view could result in discrimina-
tory hiring practices.").
200. See supra notes 164-72 and accompanying text.
201. Issacharoff & Rosenblum, supra note 9, at 2219.
202. Id.
203. See, e.g., Lally-Green, supra note 122, at 245 ("Critics ... argue that laws
that appear to give pregnant women preferential treatment are likely to jeopardize
the hiring of women due to the potential increase in costs to the employer."); Brown
et al., supra note 98, at 579 ("[A]dvocates of the 'similar treatment' approach . . *
argue that the best or even the only way to end discrimination against women is to
require similar treatment to that afforded men.").
204. Any tax increase caused by pregnancy insurance should be socialized and
not experience-rated. See supra notes 164-72 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 194-96 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 175-78 and accompanying text.
207. Issacharoff and Rosenblum observe that "more than half the work force"
does not qualify for benefits under the Family and Medical Leave Act, and the
system disproportionately favors males, who tend to work more often for the larger,
covered employers. Issacharoff & Rosenblum, supra note 9, at 2190 & n.164.
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basis appear to be the only potential alternatives. For the
reasons already discussed,2 °8 maintaining the status quo is
unacceptable. Furthermore, unpaid leave trades gender bias for
class-based discrimination.0 9 Professor Hylton has observed
that "the expected discrimination (avoidance by employers of
female workers) is likely to affect only the low-wage segment of
the female labor market, rather than women employees
generally."210 Lastly, the financial cost of a gender-neutral
expansion of unemployment insurance coverage would be great-
er, and hence even more difficult to sell politically in these
times of fiscal austerity.
The argument that special treatment for pregnancy perpet-
uates stereotypes 21' is dubious for at least two reasons. First,
the assumption that pregnancy insurance is special or prefer-
ential treatment is itself based on a male norm.21 2 Different
treatment consistent with the male norm, however, is not
viewed as special, but is considered objectively justified. Mil-
itary leave, for example, which benefits primarily men, is not
deemed special treatment.1 3 The Supreme Court's decision in
208. See supra Part III.B.
209. See Dowd, supra note 89, at 127 ("Pay is both a gender and a class issue.
Without pay, parental leave is likely to be used primarily by women because of their
position in the workforce as compared to that of men. The result is that low-income
parents, and certainly single parents, will find it virtually impossible to take the
leave.").
210. Hylton, supra note 143, at 484. Professor Hylton concludes that "[tihe class
bias is simply easy to see in the case of parental leave, where the concerns of
relatively skilled working women are at odds with those of lower-skill female
employees." Id. at 485.
211. See Dowd, supra note 134, at 717 & n.78 ("[Tihe problem with a differences
approach is that the concept of sex differences reflects a stereotyped view of the sexes
and could be used just as easily to deny equality as it could be used to promote equal
opportunity.") (footnote omitted).
212. See, e.g., Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal
Treatment /Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325, 345-46
(1985) ("Pregnancy, for [Justice] Rehnquist, is an 'extra,' an add-on to the basic male
model for humanity. Equality does not contemplate handing out benefits for ex-
tras-indeed, to do so would be to grant special benefits to women, possibly discrimi-
nating against men.").
213. Brown et al., supra note 98, at 596.
Indeed, often ostensibly gender neutral rules serve to benefit men. But the
gender bias of our culture is so deeply entrenched that these practices are
viewed as either benefitting the entire society or simply reflecting the natural
order. For example, military leave-which primarily benefits men-is defined
as critical to the public interest, but pregnancy leave is characterized as special
treatment for women.
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214Sherbert v. Verner, moreover, which held that workers sep-
arated from employment for religious reasons could not be
disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits, 215 is seen as
accommodating religion rather than preferring it.
21
Second, as noted by Professor Dowd:
[Wihere the statutes are intended to compensate for actual
disability associated with pregnancy and childbirth which
operates to disadvantage women, and therefore are based
on the existence of a real condition, they are not based on
presumed or stereotypical assumptions about the disabling
effects of pregnancy or the appropriate social roles of
women.
217
Simple biological reality avoids any need for stereotypical
assumptions and distinguishes pregnancy insurance from
gender-based parental leave. Although the charge of stereotyp-
ing can be made in the latter, it cannot in the former.
CONCLUSION
Unemployment compensation should be provided to all eligi-
ble21 1 claimants who separate from their employment because
of pregnancy. Insurance should be provided regardless of
whether the claimant is fired or has quit. Both pre- and post-
partum claimants should qualify. Toward this end, legislation
should be enacted that modifies or eliminates the need for
medical necessity, involuntariness, employer-based fault, and
availability. A claimant who has worked for her employer for at
least ten weeks prior to becoming pregnant should qualify for
214. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
215. Id. at 410; see also supra note 98 (discussing Sherbert in more detail).
216. See, e.g., Brown et al., supra note 98, at 635 ("The Sherbert Court did not
hold that the plaintiff was entitled to special treatment, which could arguably be
viewed as a violation of the establishment clause. Rather, the Court held that the
government could not penalize the plaintiff.") (footnote omitted).
217. Dowd, supra note 134, at 717 n.80.
218. By "eligible," I mean that the claimant must satisfy all other customary
eligibility requirements not discussed in this Article. For example, a claimant must
work a sufficient number of weeks to qualify for benefits. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C.
§ 3304(a)(7) (1994) (stating that "an individual who has received compensation during
his benefit year is required to have had work since the beginning of such year in
order to qualify for compensation in this next benefit year").
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unemployment benefits until she either accepts suitable em-
ployment or exhausts her benefits.21 9 Benefits should continue
post-partum for at least twelve weeks, when the claimant
should be required to renew her search for suitable employ-
ment.2 20
I offer the following model as one mechanism for insuring
pregnant workers. It is designed as state legislation, but may
be tailored to suit federal law.
MODEL PRE- AND POST-PARTUM
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE ACT
§ 1. PREGNANCY AND CHILDBIRTH SATISFY GOOD CAUSE
REQUIREMENT. Pregnancy or childbirth shall provide
an otherwise eligible claimant good cause for termi-
nating her employment within the meaning of [in-
sert cite to good cause requirement] ;221 provided, the
claimant must have worked for her last employer for
ten consecutive weeks prior to becoming pregnant.222
§ 2. PREGNANCY AND CHILDBIRTH NEED NOT BE ATTRI-
BUTABLE TO EMPLOYMENT. An otherwise eligible
claimant who separates from her employment be-
cause of pregnancy or childbirth need not establish
that the reason for the separation is attributable to
[or connected with] her employment within the
meaning of [insert cite to attribution requirement] .223
219. Benefits currently expire after 26 weeks in 48 states. Massachusetts and
Washington grant benefits up to 30 weeks. ACUC REPORT, supra note 6, at 33, 39
n.5. My proposed Model Act does not purport to enlarge these limitations.
220. A refusal of suitable employment is a disqualifying event in most states. E.g.,
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 341.370(1)(a) (Michie 1994). Under my proposal, a pregnant
claimant would not be disqualified for refusing employment, and a post-partum
claimant would not be disqualified for refusing employment during the 12-week
period immediately following childbirth.
221. This section eliminates the need for a pregnant claimant to establish good
cause for leaving her employment. It also dispenses with the requirement that preg-
nancy-related separations be medically necessary.
222. This provision tempers the risk that a claimant will use unemployment
insurance to subsidize her pregnancy. Of course, the claimant must meet all other
durational eligibility requirements. See supra note 218.
223. This provision eliminates the attribution requirement for pregnancy-related
separations.
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§ 3. AVAILABILITY ESTABLISHED BY INTENT TO RETURN
TO WORK.
(a) An otherwise eligible pregnant claimant shall not
be deemed unavailable for employment within the
meaning of [insert cite to availability requirement],
so long as she intends to seek full-time employment
beginning twelve weeks after childbirth.224
(b) An otherwise eligible claimant shall not be
deemed unavailable within the meaning of [insert
cite to availability requirement] during the twelve-
week period immediately following childbirth.225
§ 4. REFUSAL OF EMPLOYMENT NOT DISQUALIFYING.
Refusal of suitable employment shall not disqualify
an otherwise eligible pregnant claimant within the
meaning of [insert cite to disqualification provi-
sion] ,226 nor shall refusal of suitable employment
disqualify an otherwise eligible claimant if the refus-
al occurs during the twelve-week period immediately
following childbirth.227
§ 5. DEFINITIONS.
(a) CHILDBIRTH. "Childbirth" shall include the twelve-
week period immediately following the day of deliv-
ery.22 8
224. This provision insures that pregnancy does not automatically lead to
disqualification under the guise of unavailability. That the claimant intends to return
to work following childbirth should be enough of a continuing connection to the labor
force to satisfy existing federal mandates, if any. Of course, the claimant need not
actually return to work following childbirth.
225. This provision insures that a post-partum claimant will not be disqualified
for at least 12 weeks following childbirth. It draws from Issacharofis and
Rosenblum's conclusion that workers unemployed because of pregnancy should be
compensated for 12 weeks post-partum. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
226. This provision is designed to eliminate disqualification for refusing suitable
employment. It is necessary because most states require that eligible claimants seek
and accept reemployment. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 341.370(1)(a) (Michie 1994)
("A worker shall be disqualified from receiving benefits for... [failure] without good
cause either to apply for ... or to accept suitable work .... ).
227. This clause dovetails with § 3(b) of the Model Act; it insures that a claimant
will receive benefits for 12 weeks post-partum.
228. This broader definition of childbirth allows a claimant to quit after child-
birth and still receive benefits. It is designed to address the situation where a
working mother finds it necessary only after pregnancy and childbirth to quit work
and tend to her family.
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(b) PREGNANCY. "Pregnancy" shall include the period
immediately following conception until childbirth.229
American culture celebrates family, abhors discrimination,
and promises an equal opportunity for all. However, unlike
most of the industrialized world,23° our society has yet to rec-
oncile the tension between these three competing values. Pro-
viding unemployment insurance for pregnancy is not a panacea,
but it should bring greater equality to the labor market and
help to forestall the increasing feminization of poverty. More
study, of course, is needed on the financial cost of such a sys-
tem. The percentages suggested in this Article are extrapolated
and based on the experience of a single state. Still, the relative
cost of pregnancy insurance should prove to be small when
compared to the expected benefits.
229. This section clarifies the obvious; pregnancy includes the period between
conception and childbirth.
230. See O'Brien & Madek, supra note 102, at 314; see also Issacharoff &
Rosenblum, supra note 9, at 2200-14 (discussing the accommodation policies of
European countries).
